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Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code
Section 363(f) and Undermining
the Chapter 11 Process
by
George W. Kuney*
Seemingly slight misinterpretations can dramatically alter an entire statutory scheme. Like small cracks along a rock face, these slight imperfections
provide toeholds for roots, ice, wind and water that will eventually erode the
entire surface. Courts faced with interpretation of Bankruptcy Code,
§ 363(f) prove this to be all too true. Multiple misinterpretations of this
subsection of the Code have been repeatedly committed. This Article focuses on a misinterpretation that has shifted Chapter 11 from a process originally focused on confirmation of a plan of reorganization into one making
bankruptcy courts the forum of choice for sales of businesses, troubled or
not. 2 This misinterpretation provides a shield from liability for purchasers
and insiders-not debtors and their creditors-that is otherwise unavailable
under applicable nonbankruptcy law. Coupled with a provision that largely
squelches appellate review, this misinterpretation has changed the statutory
scheme and bankruptcy practice from what Congress intended when enacting
the Code. The massive increase in Chapter 11 cases and assets subject to
Chapter 11 administration in the wake of the Dot.com meltdown, the eco*Associate Professor of Law and Director of the Jaines L. Clayton Center for Entrepreneurial Law,
The University of Tennessee College of Law. B.A., 1986, University of California, Santa Cruz;J.D., 1989,
University of California, Hastings College of the Law; M.B.A., 1997, University of San Diego; Partner,
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP through 2000. The author thanks Robert R. Barnes, Joseph
H. King, Katherine "Kitty" Kruis, Robert M. Lloyd, Donna C. Looper, Thomas E. Plank, and Nancy B.
Rapoport for their insight and comments during the preparation of this Article; Johnathan H. Henderson,
Kevin M. Howard, Mark W. Pierce, and Stephanie S. Short for their able research and citation-checking
assistance; and Shelley M. Malphurs for her word processing and consistency-checking services. All fac,
tual examples presented are fictitious; any resemblance to any actual person, entity, event, or otherwise is
strictly coincidental.
'Throughout this Article, reference is made to the "Bankruptcy Code" or the "Code." All such refer,
ences are to Title 11 of the United States Code. Additionally, all citations to "section," "sections," "§," or
"§§" are to the Bankruptcy Code and all references to "Rule" or -Rules" are citations to the Federal Rules
of Bankruptcy Procedure unless otherwise noted.
2
The effect of other misinterpretations of § 363(f) is discussed in another article. See George W.
Kuney, FurtherMisinterpretationof Bankruptcy Code § 363(): Elevating In Rem Interests and Promoting
the Use of Property Law to Bankruptcy-Proof Real Estate Developments Projects (forthcoming 76 AM.
BANKR. L.J.
2002).
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nomic contraction following the World Trade Center attack, and the collapse
of energy trading giant Enron makes this trend both interesting and
3
disturbing.
The Bankruptcy Code provides two separate and distinct sets of provisions under which a Chapter 11 debtor or trustee may sell property free and
clear of claims or interests. 4 Sections 363(b) and 363(f) govern sales prior to
plan approval and impose only the Bankruptcy Code's minimal requirements
for notice and a hearing.5 Sections 1123(a)(5)(D) and 1141(c) govern sales
made as part of a plan of reorganization confirmed after extensive disclosure
and a multiple hearing process. 6
As would be expected given the more extensive process involved in plan
confirmation, the literal language of §§ 1123 and 1141 gives the bankruptcy
court broader authority to approve sales free and clear of claims and interests
than does § 363(f), which requires little in the way of notice, disclosure, and
an opportunity for objectors and alternate bidders to actually be heard. Section 1141(c) authorizes the post-sale vesting of property free and clear of all
"1claims and interests," whereas § 363(f) only authorizes the sale free of -any
interests." Bankruptcy courts, however, have chosen not to follow the plain
meaning of §363(0, 7 but instead to interpret that subsection's words "any
interest" to mean "any claim or interest" so as to give the debtor or trustee
the same power to sell prior to plan confirmation as that under a confirmed
plan, and to strip off liens, claims and other interests in the process. 8 This is a
3
See Janet Kidd Stewart, Behind the Bankruptcy Boom, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 14, 2002, at 5
(detailing record high number of publicly traded businesses filing for bankruptcy protection in 2001 and
citing problems inherent in protection for equity holders). As of this writing, Enron has proposed forming
a subsidiary that will house its North American, Central American, and South American energy infra,
structure business and then sell it to willing buyers on unspecified terms under § 363(0 in an effort to
remove viable operations out from under Chapter 11." Enron Presents Process to Creditors' Committee for
Separating Power, Pipeline Company from Bankruptcy (May 3, 2002), at <http://www.enron.com/corp/
pressroom/releases/2002>. See generally George W. Kuney, Adding an Explicit Pre-Plan Sale Process as
an Alternative Exit from Chapter 11 (forthcoming 2002) (working manuscript on file with author and
available from the author by e-mailing Kuney@libra.law.utk.edu).
'I WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES

LLP,

REORGANIZING FAILING BUSINESSES

11-2 (ABA 1998) (discuss-

ing the two methods of selling assets in Chapter 11: pursuant to a plan or a preplan sale).
511 U.S.C. § 363(b), (0 (2000). See 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (2000).
611

7

U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(5)(D), 1141(c) (2000); FED. R.

BANKR.

P. 2002, 3013, and 3016-3020.

Plain meaning is the place to begin when interpreting a statute and, if the meaning is plain, it is also
the end. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It iselementary that the meaning of a
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain,
...the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.") (citations omitted).
'This discussion may cause some to recall the alternatively criticized and praised decisions in Dewsnup
v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992) (§ 506(d) does not authorize "strip down" of undersecured lien in Chapter
7), and Nobelman v. Am. Say. Bank, 508 U.S. 324 (1993) (accord in Chapter 13), which some characterize
as prohibiting all stripdowns, including the ultimate stripdown: the "stripoff." When accurately read,
however, these decisions do not state that strip-down or stripoff is impermissible under Chapter 7, Chapter 13, or the Code itself. Rather, they stand for the more limited proposition that Chapter 7 and Chapter
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drastic change from the original focus of Chapter 11: the plan process rather
than quick sales. 9
Part I of this Article explores the state of the law regarding sales free and
clear of interests in the preplan context, concluding that the courts have incorrectly included unsecured claims as interests that can be stripped off
preplan under § 363(o.10 Part II examines the effect of the inclusion of
"claims" within § 363's use of the word "interests," which creates a fasttrack, safe-harbor procedure for asset disposition, conferring protection on
purchasers that is unavailable elsewhere." This, in turn, undermines the plan
proposal and confirmation process that was an integral part of Chapter 1i's
intent and design, and the most negative ramifications of this development
are reserved for those least able to afford or defend against them. The Article
concludes by proposing reverting to a plain-meaning interpretation of the
statute.' 2 The conclusion contrasts the plain-meaning interpretation of the
statutes involved with the misinterpretation of § 363(o and warns that the
dominant interpretation is unlikely to change absent considered, purposeful
action by Congress or the appellate courts, chiefly because the Code itself
contains provisions that effectively squelch much appellate review.

13 debtors can not use § 506(d) to effect lien stripping. See Harmon v. United States, 101 F. 3d 574, 58182 (8th Cir. 1996) (discussing this distinction as well as the accuracy of the adage that liens "ride through
bankruptcy unaffected"). Section 363(f) is drafted specifically to allow for such stripping. The National
Bankruptcy Review Commission recommended that Congress specifically examine the power of sale under
§ 363(f) and whether, inter alia, it was meant to include preplan sales free and clear of both claims and
interests. See infra note 9.
9
The National Bankruptcy Review Commission (the "NBRC") recognized this less-than-plain-meaning
interpretation and recommended amendment of the statute to accommodate it:
Clarify § 363(f). Congress should amend the Bankruptcy Code to make clear that
the court can authorize the sale of property of the estate free of creditors' claims
and interests, regardless of the relationship between the face amount of any liens
and the value of the property to be sold.
NAT'L BANKR REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, Recommendation 2.4.12, at
527-34 (1997) [hereinafter the "NAT'L BANKR REVIEW COMM'N REP."]. To date, that recommendation
has not been acted upon. See also Karen M. Gebbia, Reporter, First Report of the Select Advisory Committee on Business Reorganization, 57 Bus. LAW. 163, 168 (2001) (identifying uncertainty arising from statutory ambiguity, absence of clear standards, and variations in local legal practice and administration as
factors contributing to the perceived high cost of Chapter 11 cases). The author is not certain that simply
amending the statute to match a dominant misinterpretation is well advised or in keeping with notions of
appropriate due process for such a sweeping power of sale. See, e.g., infra notes 42-44 and accompanying
text. But see Kuney, supra note 3.
"°See infra notes 13-141 and accompanying text.
iSee infra notes 142-95 and accompanying text.
"2See infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text.
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I. THE LAW OF SALES FREE AND CLEAR WITH AND
WITHOUT A PLAN OF REORGANIZATION
A. SECTIONS 363(F) AND 1141(c)
14
Bankruptcy Code § 363(013 permits a trustee or debtor in possession
to sell property of the estate free and clear of interests in the property if any
one of five conditions is met. 15 The section provides:
The trustee may sell property under subsection (b) or (c) of
this section free and clear of any interest in such property of
an entity other than the estate, only if (1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such
property free and clear of such interest;
(2) such entity consents;
3

The bankruptcy court may have the power to sell assets free and clear even without the existence of
§ 363(f) or the plan process. See MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.),
837 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing, inter alia, to Van Huffel v. Harkelrode, 284 U.S. 225 (1931)), for
the proposition that "even absent express statutory authority, the Bankruptcy Court had the inherent
equitable power to sell a debtor's property and to transfer third-party interests to the proceeds of the sale"
and see Fierman v. Seward Nat'l Bank, 37 F.2d 11, 13 (2d Cir. 1930), for the proposition that "[w]hen the
bankrupt's property was sold free of liens, the liens upon the property became rights against the substituted proceeds of sale, and claimants to this fund were obliged to assert their rights by applying to the
court in whose custody it was"). Precedent from the Johns-Manville case, however, is suspect under the
doctrine of "good facts make bad law," see State v. Anderson, 580 N.W.2d 329 (1998) (good facts form "a
comfortable backdrop against which courts relax their vigilance"), and, at a minimum, should generally be
confined to the facts of mass tort cases. Cf Burke v. Deere & Co.,6 F.3d 497, 510 (8th Cir. 1993) (citing
Chrysler Corp. v. Wolmer, 499 So. 2d 823, 826 (Fla. 1986)), regarding limiting jury instruction from
Johns-Manville to asbestos cases. Further, more recent cases indicate little willingness to acknowledge
free-standing equitable powers in the bankruptcy courts. See, e.g., Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers,
485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) ("whatever equitable powers remain in the bankruptcy courts must and can only
be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code"); Petro v. Mishler, 276 F.3d 375 (7th Cir. 2002)
(Section 105(a) could not be used to supplement Chapter 13 confirmation standards as those were explicitly set by statute). This leads to the conclusion that the present Supreme Court would be more likely to
find that § 363(f) has circumscribed the limits of whatever original, broad equitable power of sale free and
clear may have existed in the bankruptcy courts and that even § 105 (the all writs provision) cannot be
used to expand that power. See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313-33 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
joined by Ginsburg, J., dissenting and observing problems with broad injunction issued under § 105 by
non-Article III bankruptcy judge); United States v. Energy Res. Co., 495 U.S. 545, 549-50 (1990) (broad
equitable powers of §§ 105 and 1123(b)(5) are limited if subject matter has been addressed by other
provisions of the Code or other applicable law); § 363(f) (the sale-free-and-clear-sale power may be used
"only il' one of five express conditions is met).
i4 1 1 U.S.C. § 902(5) (2000) ("trustee" generally means "debtor" in Chapter 9 cases); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1107(a) (2000) (granting a Chapter 11 debtor in possession the rights, powers, and duties otherwise
provided for the trustee under the 'Bankruptcy Code); 11 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000) (accord for Chapter 12
debtor); 11 U.S.C. § 1303 (2000) (accord for Chapter 13 debtor) .
15§ 363(0. See generally Lee R. Bogdanoff, The Purchaseand Sale of Assets in Reorganization Cases of Interest and Principal,of Principles and Interests, 47 Bus. LAW. 1367, 1415-25 (1992) (discussing many
of the issues involved in the sale of assets in bankruptcy cases that are beyond the scope of this Article,
and noting, at 1371-72, that although the sale provisions of the Code present some of its most difficult
issues of statutory construction and application, they have traditionally received little critical analysis).
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(3) such interest is a lien and the price at which such
property is to be sold is greater than the aggregate value
of all liens on such property;
(4) such interest is in bona fide dispute; or
(5) such entity could be compelled, in a legal or equitable
proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such
interest. 16
Although § 363 can be used to implement a confirmed plan, it can also be
used on a free-standing basis to authorize a preplan sale free and clear through
a trustee's or debtor in possession's motion to sell.17 The Code also contains
provisions that can explicitly render assets free and clear of claims and interests through the process of plan confirmation, consummation, and postconfirmation vesting: I8
Except as provided in subsections (d)(2) and (d)(3) of this
section and except as otherwise provided in the plan or in
the order confirming the plan, after confirmation of a plan,
the property dealt with by the plan is free and clear of all
claims and interests of creditors, equity security holders, and
of general partners in the debtor. I9
The postconfirmation vesting power can only be invoked under a confirmed
(emphasis added).
R. BANKR. P. 4001 (motion practice procedure for, inter alia,
sales free and clear). Absent an
objection, and assuming that the pleadings provide an evidentiary basis to support the sale, there is not
even the need for a hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (2000) ("after notice and a hearing" defined to authorize
court action if notice is given properly and no hearing is requested or there is no time for a hearing); see
also U.S. TRUSTEE MANUAL § 3-9.4.14 available at <http://www.usdoj.gov> (last visited June 4, 2002)
(recognizing procedure of sale of substantially all of a debtor's assets by motion as an alternative to a sale
through a plan and providing trustees with guidance as to issues that should be addressed in the scope of
their duties). For an overview of the asserted benefits of the preplan sale process, visit the website of
Insolvency Strategies, Inc., which touts asset sales of substantially all the assets of a business and includes a
recording of a hearing at which such a sale was approved. See <http://www.isinconline.com> (last visited
June 4, 2002).
1S1 1 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5) (2000) (plan may provide for sale or transfer of property); 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(b)(3) (2000) (plan may settle or adjust any claim or interest); 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (2000) (plan
may provide for sale of substantially all of the assets the estate); 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2000) (allowing
postconfirmation vesting of property free and clear of all claims and interests). When a bankruptcy case is
commenced-upon the entry of the order for relief-an estate is created and all of the debtor's nonexempt
property passes to the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000). In a Chapter 11 case, upon consummation of the
confirmed plan the property is transferred out of the estate and revests in the debtor or other entity
designated by the plan under § 1141(c). A similar provision isfound inChapter 13 cases involving adjustment of the debts of an individual with regular income. See 11 U.S.C. § 1327(c) (2000).
1611

U.S.C. § 363(f) (2000)

7

1 FED.

'911

U.S.C.

§

1141(c). Section 1141(c) compliments or enables the portion of § 1123(b) that allows a

plan to contain provisions "for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of the estate." 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(b)(4).
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The sale-and-vesting free-and-clear powers contain a number of issues
that have been resolved by the courts in ways that could not have been
predicted when the statute was enacted in 1979. For example, the term "interest"-the group of things that an asset may be sold or vested free and
clear of-is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, 2 1 despite detailed definitions for many similar foundational terms. 22 Although one commentator has
noted that courts seem to provide an interpretation of "interest" that is
broader than mere ownership interests and lien rights, 2 3 another has noted
that the courts are perhaps unduly restrictive in their interpretation of the
term. 24 Yet at the same time, courts have largely ignored the absence of the
word "claims" in § 363(0 and the contrast of that section's language with
that of § 1141(c), which explicitly speaks of vesting free and clear of claims
and interests under a confirmed plan.2 5 Despite the absence of the word
2011 U.S.C. § 1141(c). This postconfirmation vesting free and clear is independent of the issue of

whether a debtor receives a discharge from prepetition claims in the case. For example, when a debtor
liquidates under a confirmed plan, or when the reorganized debtor is not an individual (i.e., is a
noncorporeal entity such as a corporation), it does not receive a discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (2000).
There is no reason, however, that the debtor's property that is liquidated under the plan cannot vest with
the purchaser free and clear of the claims and interests of the debtor's creditors, equity security holders
and general partners. See § 1141(c) and 1141(d)(3) (Section 1141(c) does not specify with whom the
property can vest; it leaves that open-ended. Section 1141(d)(3) specifies only that the debtor is not
discharged from claims under certain circumstances; it does not deal with the debtor's or the estate's
property or a purchaser of that property).
"iSee Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. Dematteis/MacGregor, JV, 209 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir. 2000) ("The
term 'any interest' as used in section 363(f), is not defined anywhere in the Bankruptcy Code."); Minstar,
Inc. v. Plastech Research, Inc. (In re Arctic Enter., Inc.), 68 B.R. 71, 78-79 (D. Minn. 1986) (construing
"interests" under § 1141(c) to include liens).
2
See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(5) (2000) (claim), (10) (creditor), (12) (debt), (15) (entity), (16) (equity
security, which includes "interest of a limited partner in a limited partnership" or warrant or right to
purchase, sell or subscribe, but not to convert, shares of a corporation or limited partnership interest), (17)
(equity security holder), (28) (indenture), (36) (judicial lien), (37) (lien) ("a charge against or interest in
property to secure payment or performance"), (41) (person), (43) (purchaser), (49) (security), (50) (security
agreement), (51) (security interest), (54) (transfer). This definitional void may have been partially filled by
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979), in which the Court held that the nature and extent of
property rights were to be determined by applicable nonbankruptcy law-primarily state law. This may
suggest that "interest" is coextensive with "property rights recognized by applicable non-bankruptcy law."
Such an interpretation is, however, somewhat broader than that applied by the courts.
233 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 363.06[1] (15th ed., Rev. 1998).
2
Basil H. Mattingly, Sale of Property of the Estate Free and Clear of Restrictions and Covenants in
Bankruptcy, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. Rev. 431 (1996) (hereinafter Mattingly). Although two recent commentators apparently believe that the term "interest" denotes a property right in all cases, Walter W.
Miller, Jr. & Maureen A. O'Rourke, Bankruptcy Law v. Privacy Rights: Which Holds the Trump Card?,
38 Hous. L. REv. 777, 813 (2001), the authority that they cite for this proposition can be construed to
support a different interpretation. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000) (property of the estate includes "all legal
and equitable interests of the debtor in property" -inclusion of the phrase "in property" suggests a limitation on the phrase "all legal and equitable interests" just as does "of the debtor").
'$The NBRC rather coyly noted that "[w]hether the term "interests" means only security interests
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"claims" in § 363(0, preplan sales free and clear of claims are routine. 26 Finally, § 363(0's sale free-and-clear power has been interpreted expansively
(except in the area of traditional in rem interests in real property), 27 while at
the same time § 1141(c)'s vesting free-and-clear power, which is broader than
28
§ 363(o on its face, has been largely ignored and misconstrued.
and liens, or whether it also includes unsecured claims, is an unresolved question." NAT'L BANKR. R.
COMM'N REP., supra note 9, at 348.
26
A treatise prepared by perhaps the preeminent corporate restructuring firm describes the practice,
notes the lack of express language in § 363(0 to authorize sales free and clear of claims, and glosses over
the matter in a footnote that draws upon historical equitable powers and policy arguments. See 1 WEIL,
GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 4, at 11-23 n.80. But equity and policy should not trump the plain
language of a statute and should only be used where there is a gap in the statutory scheme. Cf.Protective
Comm. for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 450 (1968) ("The
need for expedition, however, is not a justification for abandoning proper standards."). See also Thomas E.
Plank, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, (forthcoming 2002) (manuscript on file with author) (analyzing
bankruptcy courts as sui generis and rejecting the oftrepeated assertion that they are courts of equity).
7
See Kuney, supra note 2.
"5This is not unusual. A Chapter 11 case that has a sale free and clear as its goal will generally
proceed straight to a preplan sale before, if ever, engaging in the costly and time consuming process of
proposing, confirming, and consummating a plan of reorganization. In fact, it is not uncommon for reorgani,
zation cases that began with a plan as their goal to end with a preplan sale. The plan process simply can
consume too much time, generate too much expense, or fail to result in a feasible exit strategy for the
debtor. Cf. In re APF, Co., No. 98-01596, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order Confirming Modified Second Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of FPA Medical Management Inc. and Certain of Its Subsidiaries and Affiliates, As Modified (Bankr. D. De. May 27, 1999) (unpublished decision)
(on file with court, docket no. 2097) (confirmation of plan of reorganization long continued, finally plan
confirmation process converted into § 363 sale with bare minimum of notice; liquidating plan followed).
Further, under § 363(m) and current best practice, a sale transaction will close shortly after court
approval and any appeal will be rendered moot, assuming that requisite findings of good faith were made
and no stay of the order is granted prior to the closing. See State v. Shenandoah Realty Partners, L.P. (In
re Shenandoah Realty Partners, L.P.), 248 BR. 505 (W.D Va. 2000) (discussing standards for stay pending
appeal and denying motion for stay); see, e.g.,
Official Comm. of Senior Unsecured Creditors of First
RepublicBank Corp. v. First RepublicBank Corp., 106 BR. 938, 940 (N.D. Tex. 1989) (appeal dismissed;
sale order entered on December 16, stayed until noon December 19, sale closed on December 19 at noon,
no stay pending appeal obtained: "the dog is dead and the appeal is moot"); see generally FED. R. BANKR. P.
8002 (orders are final and nonappealable ten days after entry). Section 363(m) of the Bankruptcy Code
provides:
The reversal or modification on appeal of an authorization under subsection (b) or
(c) of this section [which are implicated in any 363(o sale] of a sale or lease of
property does not affect the validity of a sale or lease under such authorization to
an entity that purchased or leased such property in good faith, whether or not such
entity knew of the pendency of the appeal, unless such authorization and such sale
or lease were stayed pending appeal.
11 U.S.C. § 363(m) (2000). See also Hoese Corp. v. Vetter Corp. (In re Vetter Corp.), 724 F.2d 52, 56
(7th Cir. 1983) ("good faith" for § 363(m) purposes requires a showing that there was not "fraud, collusion
between the purchaser and other bidders or the trustee, or an attempt to take grossly unfair advantage of
other bidders"). This provision creates a race to close a transaction as soon after entry of the sale order as
possible to prevent any stay from issuing and to moot potential appeals. See, e.g., In re Sax, 796 F.2d 994,
997-98 (7th Cir. 1986) (sale closed without stay of appeal, appeal was automatically mooted). See generally 1 WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, supra note 4, at 11-29 to 11-31 (describing § 363(m) authorities
and practice).
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Although § 1141(c) has been largely ignored, it provides firm statutory
support in the plan context for clearing title and blocking successor liability. 29
At the same time, § 363(o has been used for this purpose almost exclusively
since the erosion of the early prohibitions on preconfirmation reorganizationdispositive transactions.30 This in turn has led to the rough-and-ready prac29
Further support for sales free and clear of all claims in a plan setting exists when the debtor is
entitled to a discharge under the plan. If the sale takes place concurrently with or after the discharge is
granted, successor liability will be eliminated as well because the buying entity's liability is wholly deriva,
tive of the seller's liability. Once discharge is granted the source of successor liability is eliminated. See
infra note 110 and accompanying text. Of course, this argument is not available in cases in which no
discharge is available-such as corporate reorganization and liquidation cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3)
(2000) (no discharge if plan is a liquidating plan, if the debtor does not engage in business after consummation of the plan, or if the debtor would be denied a discharge in Chapter 7); 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (2000)
(no discharge to nonindividuals such as corporations, partnerships, and limited liability companies).
30
The legislative history is fairly clear that Chapter 11 cases were to produce plans of reorganization
for confirmation, not preplan liquidations. See H.R. REP. No. 95,595 (1977) ("The purpose of the reorganization ... case is to formulate and have confirmed a plan of reorganization . . . ."); Lynn M. LoPucki,
The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 57 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 99, 106 (1983) ("From the viewpoint of the courts or policy makers, confirmation and consummation
of a plan are probably both necessary elements of success."). Reflecting this purpose, early cases under the
Bankruptcy Code expressed hostility to sales of substantially all the assets of a business through the § 363
motion process. See, e.g., Institutional Creditors of Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. v. Cont'l Air Lines Inc. (In re
Cont'l Air Lines, Inc.), 780 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1986) (§ 363 "does not authorize a debtor and the
bankruptcy court 'to short circuit the requirements of a reorganization plan by establishing the terms of
the plan sub rosa in connection' with a proposed transaction," citing In re Braniff Airways, Inc., 700 F.2d
935, 940 (5th Cir. 1983)); Comm. of Equity Sec. Holders v. Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 722 F.2d
1063, 1069 (2d Cir. 1983) (introducing the "articulated business justification" for, inter alia, § 363(b) sales
of assets outside of a plan of reorganization after reviewing the history of practice under the "perishability"
standard of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 and the "upon cause shown" standard of the Chandler Act of
1938); In re White Motor Credit Corp., 14 B.R. 584, 589-90 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (§ 363(b)-use,
sale or lease of estate property out of the ordinary course of business-does not authorize the preplan sale
of substantially all estate assets in a Chapter 11 case). See generally John J. Hurley, Chapter II Alternative: Section 363 Sale of All of the Debtor's Assets Outside of a Plan of Reorganization, 58 AM. BANKR. L.J.
233 (1984) (collecting prior Bankruptcy Act and early Bankruptcy Code cases involving the preplan sale
of substantially all the assets of a debtor). These early cases focused on the overall structure and descrip,
tion of the Chapter 11 process as one in which the debtor filed its petition, the automatic stay was
invoked, a creditors' committee was appointed, plan negotiation ensued and, if successful, confirmation of a
plan followed after the debtor and its supporters had "scal[ed] the hurdles erected in Chapter 11." Cont'l
Air Lines, 780 F.2d at 1226.
As more debtors found themselves in the swamp that a Chapter 11 case can become rather than
"scaling the hurdles" of Chapter 11, many in the insolvency community began to understand the usefulness
of a quick sale of substantially all the assets of the bankruptcy estate followed by a simple plan distributing
proceeds by strict priority or conversion to Chapter 7 as an exit strategy. Thus debtors' and purchasers'
counsel fastened upon Lionel's "articulated business justification" standard, and promoted sales of substantial portions or substantially all of the estate's assets. In time, in reaction to these repeated requests for
preplan sales, the judicial bias against preplan sales of substantially all of a debtor's assets eroded. See, e.g.,
Bergemann, Inc. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. (In re Babcock & Wilcox Co.), 250 F.3d 955, 960 (5th Cir.
2001) (paying lip service to the Braniff prohibition on preplan transactions that amount to "sub rosa" plans
of reorganization while affirming preplan substantive consolidation through DIP financing approval and
coyly finding that the challenged order "neither changes the fundamental nature of the assets nor limits
future reorganization options" despite the radical changes wrought by substantive consolidation); Official
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tice of today: throwing companies into bankruptcy merely to effect an asset
sale of a business or division. 3 Even though § 363's language does not support the breadth of interpretation that courts have imposed, this trend appears unlikely to reverse itself. Although appellate courts could exercise
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc. (In re Cajun Elec. Power Coop., Inc.),
119 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 1997) (accord, approving sale of operating division including $107 million in cash
and $20 million in transmission lines and substantial litigation claims); Richmond Leasing Co. v. Capital
Bank, N.A., 762 F.2d 1303 (5th Cit. 1985) (accord, narrowly construing Braniff so as not to apply to broad
renegotiation and assumption of major equipment lease); In re Brookfield Clothes, Inc., 31 B.R. 978
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (discussing legislative history and case law under both the Bankruptcy Code and the prior
Bankruptcy Act and finding that § 363(b) sales could dispose of substantially all of a debtor's property,
preplan, assuming appropriate showing of exigency is made); In re Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co., 124 B.R.
169 (D. Del. 1991) (discussing history of standards for sales of substantially all assets out of the ordinary
course of business under the prior Bankruptcy Act and the present Bankruptcy Code and the Lionel, and
Solar Mfg.Corp., 176 F. 2d 493, 495 (3d Cir. 1949), cases and standards for sale and recognizing that the
delays inherent in the Chapter 11 plan process could themselves constitute the "emergency" to authorize
such a sale. See generally Bogdanoff supra note 15, at 1392-1401 (discussing distinctions and standards
under earlier cases for sales before and as part of plans of reorganization). Coupled with the acceptance of
using § 363(0 to erect a firewall to block successor liability, see infra notes 91-104 and accompanying text,
this evolution of judicial attitude has promoted the use of Chapter 11 as a liability-limiting "wrapper" for
what would otherwise be rather vanilla asset purchase and sale transactions of substantially all of the
assets of businesses that could otherwise be negotiated, documented, and consummated in or out of
bankruptcy.
"iSee, e.g., Nick Wingfield, Napster Files for Chapter 11 Shelter, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2002, at B6
("Napster Inc., in an expected move, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection as a prelude to a proposed
sale of the company's assets . . . ."). The evolution of Chapter 11 from cases focused on developing a plan
to ones that feature use of the Code for a single preplan procedure or protection undermines attempts to
quantify how many Chapter 11 cases are "successful." Early measurements of success focused on the
percentage of successfully confirmed plans. See Hon. Samuel L. Bufford, Chapter 11 Case Management
and Delay Reduction: An Empirical Study, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85 (1996) (citing 1989 study by
Ed Flynn of the Administrative Office of United States Courts showing plan confirmation rate of seventeen percent based on a nonrandom sample of 2395 cases drawn from across the nation over a ten-year
period); Lisa Hill Fenning & Craig A. Hart, Measuring Chapter 11:The Real World of 500 Cases, 4 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 119, 152 (1996) (noting difficulty of measuring success in Chapter 11 cases, that
confirmation of a plan does not equal economic success, and that dismissal does not necessarily equal
failure); Hon. Leif M. Clark et al., What Constitutes Success in Chapter 11? A Roundtable Discussion, 2
AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 229 (1994) (extensively discussing various types of success in Chapter 11);
Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly
Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L.REV. 597 (1993) (critically examining types of success in reorganization
and classifying sale transactions as successful reorganizations only if the core businesses remain intact in a
single entity). Even more recent measurements focus on confirmed plans and whether debtors must return
to bankruptcy courts for a second or third attempt at reorganization. Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin,
The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a "Race to
the Bottom," 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001). These measures may easily miss successful reorganizations
resulting from sales of substantially all of a debtor's assets to a purchaser that continues the debtor's
business essentially intact or other transactions that lead to a favorable reorganization without a plan.
Future studies of "success" in Chapter 11 must take these nonplan reorganizations into account to avoid
substantial undercounting. See generally Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Financial Characteristics
of Businesses in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J.
499, 566 (1999) (explaining difficulties in using empirical
measures like confirmation rates to measure success in Chapter 11 and finding that a high percentage of
Chapter 11 cases were, at least eventually, liquidations).
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independent statutory analysis and not blindly follow lower court decisions,
§ 363(m) makes this unlikely by mooting most appeals before they can be
briefed and considered on even the first rung of the appellate ladder.32
The next subsections of Part I of this Article discuss the existing precedent regarding § 363(f) and identify the fundamental misinterpretation of the
statute that is the subject of this Article: the interpretation of § 363(0's
word "interest" to include 'claims."
B.

THE CONDITIONS FOR SALES FREE AND CLEAR

1. Sections 3630)(1), (2), (3) - Unsuiprising Conditions Allowing
Sale Free and Clear
The first three alternative preconditions for preplan sales free and clear
under § 363(0 are not surprising. Under § 363(0)(1), if applicable nonbankruptcy law permits the sale, the Code also permits the sale.3 3 Essentially,
this recognizes that there is no reason to limit preexisting rights and remedies
in a liquidation or reorganization to benefit creditors and parties in interest. 34
There may be an advantage to selling the assets under § 363(0)(1) rather than
the applicable nonbankruptcy law, since under § 363(0)(1) there is no need to
follow the procedures of applicable nonbankruptcy law that one has used to
justify the sale. 35 This may result in savings of time and money.
32

The appellate ladder for bankruptcy decisions has an extra rung over that of the gardenvariety
federal civil action. Bankruptcy court decisions are appealed to the district courts or to bankruptcy appellate panels, whose decisions are appealed to the circuit courts of appeals. Finally, resort may be had to the
United States Supreme Court for a fourth, albeit discretionary, decision on the matter. The extra step
involved, combined with the uncertain precedential value of bankruptcy appellate panel decisions, makes
development of uniform standards and practices more difficult in bankruptcy than in those areas of law
where the direct appeal is to the circuit court of appeals, whose decision is binding precedent upon all
courts within the circuit. See generally Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir.
1990) (bankruptcy appellate panel decisions rendered by Article I bankruptcy judges cannot bind Article
III district courts). This odd system of appeals has a tendency to suppress the development of a dependable, consistent, uniform body of bankruptcy law. See Hon. Eugene R. Wedoff, BAPS-Good, But Not Good
Enough, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32 (2000) (detailing the idiosyncracies of bankruptcy law and practice
that retard development of a dependable, consistent body of bankruptcy law). U.S. TRUSTEE MANUAL
§ 3-9.4.14 (Feb. 25, 2002) available at <http://www.usdoj.gov> ("Many courts do not find a sale of most
or all of a debtor's assets by motion to be objectionable .... The United States Trustee must become
familiar with the prevailing case law in his/her district."). This tendency is enhanced in the case of § 363
because of parties using § 363(m) to moot most appeals even before they reach the district court or
bankruptcy appellate panel. See supra note 28. The result is that, for there to be national uniformity of
interpretation of § 363(f), legislative action is required. The protections of § 363(m) moot too many
appeals for the normal process of appellate review and development of precedent to function effectively.
3311 U.S.C. § 363(0(1) (2000).
34
"Parties in interest" is a phrase used in no less than 106 sections of the Bankruptcy Code and 79 of
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, yet it also is undefined in the Code or the Rules.
35
Scherer v. Fed. Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n (In re Terrace Chalet Apartments, Ltd.), 159 B.R. 821, 824-25
(N.D. I11.1993) (specifying that the notice, manner, and timing of a sale free and clear are provided by
Rules 2002(a)(2) and 6004(f)(1) and not by the state foreclosure law used to justify the sale).
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Similarly, under § 363(f)(2), if the party asserting the interest consents to
the sale free and clear of that interest, the Code permits the sale. 36 There is
37
no reason to bar a consensual transaction that will benefit the estate.
Finally, under § 363(f)(3), a sale free and clear of liens (a subset of interests) is authorized when it will result in proceeds which exceed the aggregate
value of all liens on the property. 38 The liens exist to secure payment; if the
payment is made, there is no need for the liens. A sale under § 363(f)(3) does,
however, significantly change the rights of the parties, and may negatively
affect a lienholder who is forced to receive an accelerated prepayment of a
39
long-term obligation.
The one controversial aspect of § 363(f)(3) concerns the amount of the
payment that must be made to a purportedly secured creditor when the value
of the collateral will not support full payment of the claim. In other words, if
an undersecured creditor holds a one hundred dollar claim secured by property worth sixty dollars, does the sale have to produce proceeds of sixty or
one hundred dollars to be authorized under § 363(f)(3)?40 Even after the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984,'4 1 which at3611

U.S.C. § 363(0(2) (2000). The statute requires actual consent, not 'deemed consent" based upon

a failure to object. In re Roberts, 249 B.R. 152 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2000) (when failure to object is the
standard, the statute and rules use the phrase "after notice and a hearing," defined in § 102(1)(B)(i), which
authorizes the no.hearing-without-objectionandrequest-forhearing procedure that is pervasive in bankruptcy practice and is colloquially known as "scream or die"). But see Citicorp Home Owner Serv., Inc. v.
Elliot (In re Elliot), 94 B.R. 343, 345-46 (E.D. Penn. 1988) (failure to object is insufficient implied consent
to satisfy
§ 363(f)(2)).
7
3 A similar policy underlies § 363(b)'s authorization of postpetition ordinary course of business transactions. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Dant & Russell, Inc. (In re Dant & Russell, Inc.), 853 F.2d 700 (9th
Cir. 1988) (discussing policy in context of standard for judging which transactions are within the ordinary
course of business and which are not).
3811 U.S.C. § 363(0(3) (2000). Interestingly the § 363(f)(3) sale can even be a sale arranged after a
secured creditor has seized the collateral. The trustee or debtor in possession need merely obtain turnover
of the property at issue under § 542, and then seek to sell the property free and clear under § 363().
Austein v. Schwartz (In re Gerwer), 898 F.2d 730, 734 (9th Cir. 1990) (Chapter 7 case; § 542 recovery
and § 363(f)(4) sale), see also United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198 (1983) (Chapter 11
application of § 542 to allow debtor to recover property seized by the IRS prepetition). But see Thomas
E. Plank, The Creditor in Possession under the Bankruptcy Code: History, Text, and Policy, 59 MD.L.
REv. 253 (2000) (criticizing the Whiting Pools decision and, by implication, the Gerwer decision also).
59
A prepayment risk like this is of interest to those involved in asset based lending, and securitization
transactions. It is traditionally guarded against by including a prepayment fee in the note secured by the
lien. These fees will be enforced and counted toward the total aggregate payoff amount unless found to be
an unenforceable penalty. See generally David Grey Carlson, Over Secured Creditors under Bankruptcy
Code § 506(b): The Limits of Postpetition Interest, Attorneys' Fees, and Collection Expenses, 7 BANKR.
DEv. J. 381 (1990) (discussion of enforcement of prepayment charges and related matters).
4
°See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2000) (a claim is a secured claim to the extent of value in collateral); 11
U.S.C. § 506(d) (2000) (liens in excess of value are void). Section 363(k) also provides a secured creditor
with protection at the sale. That section allows the creditor to credit bid and acquire the property
through offset of its claim against the purchase price and payment of any net balance due. 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(k)
(2000).
4
Pub. L. No. 98,353, 98 Stat. 372 (1984). Despite effective lobbying efforts, special interest groups
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tempted to resolve this question by amending the statute, the courts are split
as to whether the statute requires the payment of the economic value of the
lien or the full amount of the obligation that the lien secured.42 Despite an
active secured creditors' lobby and a good description in the House and Senate Reports of the intent to affect the later interpretation, the statute was
amended to read "if the proceeds exceed the value of all liens on the property-again utilizing the confusing concept of "valuing a lien" rather than
referring to the total amount of a debt secured, or purportedly secured, by
43
the lien.
While the first three of the five § 363(f) alternative conditions are fairly
straightforward, the last two could not be more different. They address nonconsensual transfers of the highest order, and can lead to seemingly bizarre
results if unchecked.

that persuade Congress to amend the Bankruptcy Code to address their parochial interests may then fail
to supply Congress with legislative "fixes" that actually achieve the desired result. See, e.g., George W.
Kuney & Jeffrey R. Patterson, Single Asset Real Estate Under § 362(d)(3): A Narrower Construction
Than You Might Expect (or, Why Every Hotel Should Have a Gift Shop and Troubled Golf Courses Should
Keep Their Bars Open), 26 CAL. BANKR. J. 123 (2002) (discussing flawed amendments of §§ 101 and
362(d) to address concerns of lenders with single asset real estate collateral and the reaction of bankruptcy
courts to the effort).
42
Compare In re Beker Indus. Corp., 63 B.R. 474, 477 (Bankr, S.D.N.Y. 1986) (statutory "aggregate
value of all liens" means the actual economic value of the lien, i.e., the sixty dollars in the example above)
with Richardson v. Pitt County (In re Stroud Wholesale, Inc.), 47 B.R. 999, 1002 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (statutory -aggregate value of all liens" means the full amount of all debt secured by the liens, i.e., $100 in the
example above), affd 983 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1986).
4
See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 344 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6301,02 ("trustee
may sell free and clear if ...
the sale price of the property isgreater than the amount secured by the lien");
accord S. REP. No. 95-989, at 56 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5842; Bankruptcy Amend,
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 372. As stated in In re Terrace
Chalet Apts, Ltd., 159 B.R. 821, 826-27 (N.D. I11.
1993):
The Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984 further demonstrate that Section 363(f)
does not protect merely the actual value of the lien. Previously, Section 363(0(3)
authorized a sale free and clear of liens if the sale proceeds exceeded the value of the
"interests" of secured parties in the property. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 372. In 1984, Congress
amended Section 363(0(3) to authorize a sale if the proceeds exceeded the value of
"all liens on the property." Id. When Congress intends to denote the concept of
"actual value" in the Bankruptcy Code, it consistently refers to the value of the
secured party's interest. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 361 (using the phrase "the interest of an
entity in property" to express the concept of actual value); 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)
(using the phrase "value of such creditor's interest" to denote actual value);
§ 1129(a)(7)(B) (using the phrase "value of such holder's interest" to express actual
value). Congress deleted the language of Section 363()(3) that courts have consist,
ently interpreted as denoting actual value. This deletion suggests that Congress
intended for Section 363(f)(3) to protect other than actual value.
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2. Section 363Q)(4) - Sale When the Interest is in Bona Fide
Dispute
Although far-reaching, this condition to the power of' sale free and clear
appears easily understood and applied. If the property interest is subject to
bona fide dispute 44 by the interested parties, the property can be sold free6
and clear of 'that interest, 45 which will generally attach to the proceeds.4
This provision allows productive assets subject to deadlocking disputes to be
transferred to a third party so that they can remain economically productive,
while the original parties may continue to litigate or otherwise proceed to
47
resolve their dispute.
44The definition of "bona fide" in this context is also less than clear, see Cheslock-Bakker & Assocs. v.
Kremer (In 'reDowntown Athletic Club), No. M-47-JSM, 2000 WL 744126, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. June 9,
2000) (citing In re Collins, 180 B.R. 447, 452 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995), for the proposition that -bona fide"
dispute requires -an objective basis for either a factual or legal dispute"), although it is clearly the burden
of the moving party, debtor in possession or trustee, to establish that it has been met. In re Octagon
1991). In the case of a securedcreditor-versus-debtor dispute
Roofing, 123 B.R. 583, 590 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
it is unnecessary that either party have commenced an adversary proceeding challenging the priority,
validity, and extent of the lien at issue. In re Oneida Lake Dev., Inc., 114 B.R. 352, 357-58 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Millerburg, 61 BR. 125 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1986). The dispute need not even be
between the estate and a third party. Disputes between third parties will satisfy the condition in the
proper case. In re Gerwer, 898 F.2d at 733 (dispute between secured creditor and third party will justify
sale under § 363(0(4) if the outcome of the dispute could indirectly deplete or enhance the estate). It is
probably a jurisdictional minimum that the court conclude that the property to be sold is actually property
of the estate. See Missouri v. United States Bankr. Court, 647 F.2d 768, 778 (8th Cir. 1981) (requiring
examination to determine that estate has a substantial ownership right). It appears likely that courts
interpreting the "bona fide dispute" requirement for § 363(0(4) would follow as persuasive the line of
cases construing the term for purposes of § 363(b)(1) relating to qualified petitions filing an involuntary
petition. These cases have generally held that a bona fide dispute is measured under an "objective test" as
to whether there is a genuine issue of material fact or a meritorious contention regarding the application of
law to fact. Liberty Tool & Mfg. v. Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc. (In re Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc.), 262 F.3d
985, 990 (9th Cir. 2001), amended and superseded by 277 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing as the originating case In re Lough, 57 B.R. 993, 996-97 (E.D. Mich. 1986), collecting other appellate courts adopting this
standard, and noting that the "subjective" test of In re Johnston Hawks, Ltd., 49 B.R. 823 (Bankr. D. Haw.
1985) has been largely discarded).
4511 U.S.C. § 363(f)(4) (2000). Unlike sales under § 363(f)(2), failure to object to a sale of property
under § 363()(4) can constitute implied consent to the sale. In re Elliot, 94 B.R. at 345-46; Pelican
Homestead v. Wooten (In re Gabel), 61 B.R. 661, 667 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1985).
46
Attachment to the proceeds is the most common form of adequate protection, although it is not the
only option. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e); see also Bankruptcy Law Revision: Report of the Committee on the
Judiciary to Accompany H.R. 8200, H.R. REP. No.95-595 (1977); H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. (1978) (indicating that sale free and clear in bona fide dispute circumstances and notions of adequate protection originated
well before enactment of the Code). The mechanism of providing adequate protection is limited only by
the imagination of the parties and the court. Id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(d) (2000) (trustee may use, sell
or lease property only to the extent not inconsistent with relief granted under § 363(c)-(f)).
47
There is no reason that the transferee cannot be an entity owned or controlled by one of the original
parties. See, e.g., supra note 3 (discussing Enron's proposal to form a subsidiary to purchase its operating
assets). For instance, there is no express restriction preventing one of two or more entities that assert an
ownership interest in property from commencing a Chapter 11 case and forming a separate nondebtor
entity to which the property would be sold. Cf.In re Apex Oil Co., 92 B.R. 847, 869 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
1988) (affiliation of insider of debtor with purchaser is not sufficient to show lack of good faith for
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a. Section 363(0(4) in the Simple Case Makes Common Sense
Sales under § 363(f)(4) make straightforward good sense in the simple
case involving economically productive assets. For example, productive agricultural land, a housing development, or an oil field might otherwise lie fallow
until a multi-party dispute between co-owner, alleged co-owners, and secured
creditors is finally resolved. In the bankruptcy case of an owner of these
assets, a sale free and clear allows the asset to return to productivity, with
attendant societal benefits, while the owners' and creditors' interests are adequately protected, generally by being transmuted into an interest in the proceeds of the sale. 48 Assuming something approaching a perfect market for the
sale of the asset, the owners are not materially harmed and economic effi49
ciency is served.
Essentially, then, § 363(f)(4) can be used as an expeditious method to
clear title to a disputed asset. The process also ensures that none of the
parties claiming an interest in property subject to the bona fide dispute will
directly 5° receive the property in question. Their dispute, which may be the
precipitating event making resort to bankruptcy relief necessary, can be resolved in due course, but the asset will be transferred beyond the dispute and
their reach. Owned by a third party, it can return to economic
51
productivity.
§ 363(m) purposes; good faith is an absence of fraud, collusion with other bidders, or an attempt to take
grossly unfair advantage of other bidders). Assuming such a transaction were approved, it effects a forced
buyout of the nondebtor party's interest, whatever that may be, that will be satisfied with the proceeds of
sale, if the interest is finally adjudicated valid. Further, the aggrieved party's opportunity for appellate
review of the sale order will often be eliminated by an express finding in the order approving the sale that
the purchaser has acted in good faith combined with a prompt closing of the transaction unless a stay
pending appeal is quickly obtained. See Regions Bank v. Rivet, 224 F.3d 483, 492 (5th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 531 U.S. 1126 (2001) (bankruptcy court sale free and clear orders are self-executing); 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(m) (2000); see supra note 28. For these reasons, it is common for bankruptcy purchase and sale
agreements to feature a sale-order-remains-unstayed condition to closing (as opposed to a more traditional
transactional orderisfinal-and-nonappealable condition that one might expect), and for the sale to close as
soon after the order is entered as is possible. This makes it physically impossible to obtain a stay of the
order, effectively mooting the appeal. See, e.g., Official Comm. of Senior Undersecured Creditors of First
RepublicBank Corp. v. First RepublicBank Corp., 106 B.R. 938 (N.D. Tex.1989) (sale closed at same
instant sale order was effective; appeal of order on grounds that the sale constituted a sub rosa plan of
reorganization dismissed as moot).
48
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2000).
49
See generally John D. Ayer, The Role of Finance Theory in Shaping Bankruptcy Policy, 3 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 53 (1995) (reviewing bankruptcy and finance theories including the efficient market
hypothesis).
5
°There is no per se prohibition on the debtor regaining indirect ownership and control through sale to
a debtor-or insider -controlled entity. See supra note 47.
"iThere is a striking similarity between the § 363(0(4) solution and a common parental solution to
children bickering over a new toy: "If the two of you can't agree on who plays with it, neither of you does.
Instead, I'll return it to the store for a refund."
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b. Bizarre Results May Arise Under § 363(f)(4)
Beyond the simple case, however, the § 363(f)(4) power to sell free and
clear can lead to bizarre results. Consider the following example: A company
closes a new round of financing by issuing publicly traded securities. It receives the proceeds of the transaction, twenty million dollars. A week later
it releases disappointing information regarding operations, product development, and an inability to obtain a needed government approval. Immediately,
a class action securities-fraud suit is filed seeking to rescind the financing and
recover the proceeds for the investors. The company denies wrongdoing,
stating that the negative news and results were unknown until after the
transaction had closed.
The plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to enjoin the company from using the proceeds of the financing pending
resolution of the securities-fraud action. Before the district court can even
consider the request for a temporary restraining order, the company files a
Chapter 11 petition in another district. 52 The original district court action is
53
automatically stayed.
The company continues to operate, using the proceeds of the financing,
while seeking to sell substantially all of its assets, including the balance of the
twenty million dollars in financing proceeds, to a "white knight" conglomerate, which will continue the company's operations in a separate subsidiary,
transferring the twenty million dollars into its central cash concentration account where it will be used to fund activities of the entire corporate group.
The conglomerate will pay for the acquisition with its own stock, which is
not presently publicly traded. 54 The debtor will distribute this stock to its
creditors and stockholders under its Chapter 11 plan after the stock has been
52
Strategically, filing the Chapter 11 case in a different district where venue is otherwise proper will
maximize the disruptive effect of the bankruptcy filing on the class action and minimize the chances of
smooth coordination between the district and bankruptcy courts, as well as the ease of withdrawing the
reference to the bankruptcy court of the Chapter 11 case from the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408
(1994) (venue of cases under title 11); 28 U.S.C. § 1452 (1994) (removal of claims related to bankruptcy
cases). If the securities fraud suit and the Chapter II case are both filed in the same district, the district
court could simply withdraw the reference of the bankruptcy case to the bankruptcy court and hear both
the securities fraud action and the Chapter 11 proceeding, perhaps consolidating them. Of course, interdis,
trict transfer is possible, see 28 U.S.C. § 1412 (1994) (change of venue based on the interest of justice or
convenience of the parties), but it is another level of complexity and delay for the plaintiffs as the debtor
exercises its "second mover" advantage gained through the Chapter 11 filing.
"11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2000) (automatic stay of actions against the debtor).
' 4The transaction can fairly easily be structured as a reverse triangular merger with the result that the
conglomerate becomes a publicly traded company without having to comply with the Securities Act of
1933, 48 Stat. 74, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000) (or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 905,
908 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b (2000) et seq. and their related regulations (17 C.F.R. parts
230 and 240)). See generally George W. Kuney, Going Public Via Chapter 11: 11 U.S.C. Sections 1125(e)
and 1145, 23 CAL. BANKR. J. 3 (1996).
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valued by the bankruptcy court. 55 If the sale of the assets for stock is approved under § 363(f)(4),56 the most the recent investors can ever hope to
receive, whether they take their distribution on account of their fraud claims
or their equity interests, is the stock of the conglomerate. This certainly is
not the same thing as their money back or their prior equity interest in the
stand-alone company, and it is far from a minor modification of their contract,
securities law, and tort rights involved in the class action.
Boiled down, this means that a soon-to-be debtor may be able to obtain
property of another by conversion or fraud and then reorganize, using the
value of the wrongfully obtained property, paying the prior owner only if she
later successfully proves her case. In any event, the prior equity participants
will not get their property back, even if they prevail.57 The most they can
expect is payment of its value, or an approximation of that value as pronounced by a bankruptcy judge, assuming the debtor has sufficient assets to
make such a payment once the adjudication of rights is complete.
The main limitations on this scenario are imposed by the requirements of
a bona fide dispute, good faith,58 and a jurisdictional finding that the debtor
"The problem of valuation of the stock is very thorny and beyond the scope of this Article. Even if
the stock is already publicly traded, market volatility and the likely effect of bulk sales by entities receiving
stock under the plan make accurate valuation difficult if not impossible. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Comment:
Shareholder Interests and Bankruptcy, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 711, 712 (1993) (determination of reorganization value by the court for purposes of valuing securities is a "guess confounded by an estimate"); David G.
Carlson, Secured Creditors and the Eely Characterof Bankruptcy Valuations, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 63, 64
(1991) (positing that all bankruptcy court valuations are subjective, hypothetical, and inherently inaccurate); see, e.g., Citibank v. Baer, 651 F.2d 1341, 1347 (10th Cir. 1980) (court notes the absurdity of its
valuation of over $90 million of as yet undiscovered oil in the Canadian Arctic down to the nearest $50);
see also George W. Kuney, FinancialReporting by Chapter 11 Debtors: A Limited Critique of S.O.P. 90,7,
5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 311 (1996) (finding accounting guideline unworkable because "reorganization
value" is generally never determined by the court as such and is imprecise in any event). There is no
substitute for the market in this respect.
"Based upon the bona fide dispute that is the securities fraud action.
"7This may be an overstatement. Courts recognize a distinction between whether or not the debtor
acquires title to the property under applicable nonbankruptcy law. If title is obtained, even if subject to
recission, the property will constitute property of the estate, and sale under § 363(f)(4) and the scenario
discussed in the text can proceed. If good title is not obtained, such as when the debtor obtains the
property by outright theft, it is not property of the estate and § 363 cannot be used to effect its sale. See
Kitchen v. Boyd (In re Newpower), 233 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2000) (money misappropriated by debtor
prepetition was not property of the estate but proceeds of that money were property of the estate).
"Good faith under § 363 is an absence of fraud, collusion with other bidders, or an attempt to take
grossly unfair advantage of other bidders. Bleaufontaine, Inc. v. Roland, Int'l (In re Bleaufontaine, Inc.),
634 F.2d 1383, 1388 (5th Cir. 1981); accord In re Apex Oil Co., 92 B.R. 847, 869 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1988);
see also In re Rock Indus. Mach. Corp., 572 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1978) (good faith is founded solely upon
integrity of conduct in sale process). This is analogous to the sometimes loosely stated good faith require,
ment for plan confirmation under § 1129(a)(3). See Connell v. Coastal Cable T.V., Inc., (In re Coastal
Cable T.V., Inc.), 709 F.2d 762, 764 (ist Cir. 1983) ("[A] chapter 11 reorganization plan must be submit,
ted in good faith .... That is to say, there must be some relation-at least an arguable relation-between
the chapter 11 plan and the reorganization-related purposes that the chapter was designed to serve.")
(citations omitted); Jorgensen v. Fed. Land Bank (In re Jorgensen), 66 B.R. 104, 109 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986)
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or estate has an interest in the property in question. 59 These are slight limitations indeed.
3. Section 363(f)(5) - The Standard That Could Have Swallowed
the Others
The final alternative condition for a sale free and clear under § 363(f) is
potentially the broadest of all: § 363(0(5). It provides for sale free and clear
of interests if the interest holder "could be compelled, in a legal or equitable
proceeding, to accept a money satisfaction of such interest."60 The requirement is phrased in the passive voice and does not identify who or what is
instituting the hypothetical proceeding that compels the interest holder to
accept a money judgment. This suggests that there are no limits on the identity of the hypothetical actor or legal or equitable proceeding. A plain reading of the statute is: If an entity can be forced to accept money for the
property interest at law or in equity, its interest can be stripped off the asset
61
in a § 363 sale.
a. What Proceedings Qualify? Hypothetical NonBankruptcy
Proceedings that are Broadly Accepted
Uniform Commercial Code ordinary-courseof-business sales 6 2 and fore(a Chapter 11 plan is filed in good faith if the plan proponent has exhibited "a fundamental fairness in
dealing with [the] creditors" and if the plan "will achieve a result consistent with the objectives and
purposes of the Code") (citations omitted).
59
ITNX v. Alpha Bus. Group, Inc. (In re Hurt), 9 Fed. Appx. 780, No. 00,15088, BAP No. AZ-9801532-KPRy, 2001 WL 615282 (9th Cir. June 5, 2001); see Cont'l Nat'l Bank v. Sanchez (In reToledo),
170 F.3d 1340, 1343 (11th Cir. 1999) ("It is questionable whether § 363(0 gives a bankruptcy court
power to order or approve a sale of property that belongs only to an entity in which the estate holds an
interest, and not the estate itself."); Missouri v. United States Bankr. Court, 647 F.2d 768, 778 (8th Cir.
1981) (requiring examination to determine that estate has a substantial ownership right).
611 U.S.C. § 363(0(5) (2000). The legal or equitable proceeding is referred to in this Article as the
"hypothetical proceeding" from time to time. One commentator notes that this abbreviated terminology
may obscure an important distinction. Rather than encompassing the entirety of judicial proceedings,
Professor Plank suggests that law and equity are just two components of many types of proceedings. He
generis in nature, and thus do
contends that bankruptcy courts are not courts of equity but, rather, are sui
not conduct legal or equitable proceedings. Plank, supra note 26 (finding bankruptcy to be outside of both
law and equity and that confusing bankruptcy with equity jurisdiction is unwarranted). Under this analysis, then, use of a hypothetical admiralty proceeding in which the general maritime law would compel a
party to accept monetary compensation in exchange for an interest in property-a salvage lien perhapscan not satisfy § 363(0(5)'s requirement for a sale free and clear in bankruptcy. Neither would a hypo,
thetical bankruptcy proceeding.
61See Mattingly, supra note 24, at 431 (championing this interpretation and the use of eminent domain
as the source of a § 363(0(5) power of sale free and clear of all interests). Professor Plank's distinction
between law and equity on the one hand and other proceedings on the other, see supra note 26, does not
undermine Professor Mattingly's stance. Eminent domain, or, more precisely, a proceeding to recover for
an uncompensated taking by the state under its eminent domain power, is a legal or equitable proceeding,
note 74.
upon the forum and the regime under which it is brought. See infra
depending
62
See U.C.C. §§ 9-320 (1999) (ordinary course of business sale is free and clear, even if proceeds are
less than the full amount secured by a lien) and 9-322(c) (1999) (security interest in proceeds of sale).
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closure sales 63 are commonly recognized hypothetical proceedings that can
satisfy § 363(f)(5).64 These nonesoteric nonbankruptcy proceedings give the
courts little pause when interpreting § 363(f)(5). If the claimant, generally a
lienholder, could be forced to accept a monetary satisfaction through the process of foreclosure, the condition is satisfied and the sale may take place. It is
not even clear that a senior lien must actually exist, as foreclosure of a hypo65
thetical priming tax lien may conceivably satisfy the condition.
b.Do Bankruptcy Proceedings Themselves Count?
Some courts hold that a hypothetical cramdown confirmation proceeding 66 that would result in removal of the interest from the asset satisfies the
§ 363(0(5) analysis, although generally they do not actually perform the anal67
ysis or take into account the § 1111(b) election and its ramifications.
Collier notes that construing § 363(0)(5) to require full payment of all sums secured by a lien makes no
sense when the sale is an ordinary course of business sale under § 363(c)-there is little chance that sale of
an item of inventory will satisfy debt secured by the entire inventory. 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
363.07 (15th ed. 1994), ascited by In re Grand Slam U.S.A., Inc., 178 B.R. 460, 461,64 (E.D. Mich.
1995). On the other hand, it is difficult to see why an ordinary course of business sale is a § 363(f)(5)
matter-§ 363(0(1) would appear more directly implicated. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f)(1) (2000) (sale free
and 63clear permitted if authorized by state law).
See U.C.C. § 9,610 (1999).
643 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
363.06[6] (15th ed., Rev. 1998). Foreclosure sales resulting from
judicial proceedings seem to fall directly within the words of the statute. More problematic is Collier's
assertion that ordinary course of business sales constitute "proceedings" for purposes of § 363(f). Between
these extremes lie trustee-conducted foreclosure sales under a deed of trust with no judicial involvement.
The issue becomes one of whether a judicial proceeding is required for something to be a "legal or equitable
proceeding"- like judicial foreclosure-or if it is enough that the proceeding be sanctioned or authorized
by law-like ordinarycourseof-business and nonjudicial foreclosure sales. If any proceeding authorized by
law or equity is sufficient, then Professor Plank's assertions that bankruptcy is sui generis and that a
bankruptcy court is not a court of equity are irrelevant to the § 363(f)(5) analysis. See Plank, supra note
26. 5
6 Cf. In re Grand Slam U.S.A., 178 B.R. at 461-64 (hypothetical administrative expense subordinating
lien 66allowed sale without payment in full of subordinated debt).
See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2000). "Cramdown" refers to confirmation of a plan of reorganization that
has not been accepted by all classes of claims and interests as required by § 1129(a)(8). In such a circumstance, as long as the other requirements of § 1129(a) have been met, the plan can be confirmed if it does
not discriminate unfairly and is fair and equitable with respect to each impaired class that has not accepted
the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2000). That seemingly simple description of cramdown, while accurate,
does not illuminate the many complexities involved, which are beyond the scope of this Article. See
generally Kenneth N. Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New Bankruptcy
Code, 53 AM. BANKR. LJ. 133 (1979); Kenneth N. Klee, Cram Down II, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J.229 (1990).
If bankruptcy proceedings are sui generis and do not constitute legal or equitable proceedings, see Plank
supra note 26, then using any kind of hypothetical bankruptcy proceeding to satisfy the condition of
§ 363(f)(5)
should not be permitted.
67
See, e.g., In re Perroncello, 170 B.R. 189, 191 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994) (the "tools" provided by the
Code are valuation proceedings under § 506(a) and cramdown under § l129(b)(2)-no mention of
§ 1111(b) or its ramifications); Hunt Energy Co. v. United States (In re Hunt Energy Co.), 48 B.R. 472,
485 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) ("The issue before this Court, therefore, is whether [a senior secured creditor and a junior nominally secured creditor] could be compelled in a legal or equitable proceeding to accept
a money satisfaction of their interest. This Court finds they could be compelled, in the context of a cram,
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Under this theory, if the entity could be forced to accept a money satisfaction for its interest in a cramdown, then sale free and clear is permitted. 6 To
date, reported cases dealing with § 1129(b)(2) cramdown as the mechanism
used to extinguish an interest under § 363(f)(5) have involved liens, not ownership claims or traditional in rem interests that run with the land. The
problem with this argument as applied to liens is that it ignores the
§ 1111(b) election available to most 69 secured creditors. 70 Consider a creditor hypothetically making the § 1111(b) election in a hypothetical
cramdown. Making the election means that the creditor would retain its lien
on the property and be entitled to a payment stream equal to the face amount
of its claim with a present value equal to the value of the lender's collateral,
would have a credit-bid right at a sale of the property, or would be entitled
to the indubitable equivalent of its claim-all of which either make stripping
off the lien or the sale itself impossible or at least unlikely.
Although the cramdown analysis under § 363(f)(5) may fail because of
§ 1111 (b) in the case of liens, it would not fail when used to address other
sorts of interests. Those interests would be nonsecurity interests for which
the § 111 1(b) election is not an option, the credit-bid right of § 363(k) would
have no application, the secured-creditor protections of § 1129(b)(2)(A)
down under Section 1129(b) ....
[by receiving] 'the indubitable equivalent'" of their claims, which the
court found to be equal to the sale price of the asset; § 111 (b) not mentioned); accord Mut. Life Ins. Co.
of New York v. Red Oak Farms, Inc. (In re Red Oak Farms, Inc.), 36 B.R. 856, 858-59 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1984) (but finding that indubitable equivalent would not be realized and, thus, declining to approve sale).
683 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 363.06[6][a] (15th ed., Rev. 1998). The court in Scherer v. Federal
National Mortgage Ass'n (In re Terrace Chalet Apts., Ltd.), 159 BR. 821 (N.D. Ill.
1993), authorized the
sale and extinguishment of a lien under § 363(0(5) because the creditor involved could be crammed down
and the creditor's lien extinguished pursuant to § 1129(b)(2). '[T]he decisions that require full satisfaction absent a showing of equitable consideration fail to capture the essence of Section 363(f)(5).... Section
363(f)(5) would repeat Section 363()(3) if it were interpreted merely to require a specific amount of
money that the trustee could pay to sell the property free and clear of a lien." Id. at 829. "By its express
terms, Section 363(f)(5) permits lien extinguishment if the trustee can demonstrate the existence of an,
other legal mechanism by which a lien could be extinguished without full satisfaction of the secured debt.
Section 1129(b)(2) cram down is such a provision." Id. Given that the statute does not exclude proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code from the hypothetical proceedings that may satisfy § 363(f)(5), this is a
solid, plain-language interpretation. It would also
support use of ahypothetical eminent domain proceeding as discussed in the next section.
6911

U.S.C. § 111 1(b)(1)(B) (2000) (prohibiting creditors with inconsequential interests or those with

recourse against the debtor from making the election).
7
°Under § llll(b), most secured creditors have the right to elect to avoid claim bifurcation into
secured and unsecured claims and have their entire claim treated as an allowed secured claim. As a result,
under the cramdown provisions of the Code, such an electing creditor isentitled either to (i) retain its lien
on the property and receive a payment stream with a present value at least equal to the truly secured
portion of its claim and a total face amount equal to at least the total claim, or (ii)credit bid up to 100% of
its total claim amount at a sale of the collateral under a plan, or (iii) realize the indubitable equivalent of its
claims. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i),(iii) (2000). The first, and most commonly used, alternative prevents
strip-off of the lien by its express terms. The effects of the second and third alternatives are not altogether
clear.
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would not be triggered, and the debtor's hypothetical plan would only need
to satisfy the absolute priority rule or its new value exception. 7 l It does not
take a very clever bankruptcy attorney to envision a confirmable Chapter 11
plan that provides for interest stripping for one class if all other treatment
and funding provisions of the plan can be hypothetical. The only restrictions
are the ill-defined standards of unfair discrimination and lack of fair and equi72
table treatment.
Similarly, some courts have considered and authorized sale free and clear
of liens if those liens could be subordinated under § 724(b) and disallowed
73
and stripped down under § 507(a)(1).
c. Hypothetical Eminent Domain Proceedings
Given-that'any property or property interest can be taken by the state
through the process of eminent domain, a legal proceeding in which the inter74
est holder is compelled to accept a money satisfaction of its interest,
§ 363(0(5) would appear to obviate the need for the other subsections of
§ 363(0. 75 To date, no courts have mentioned this position in a published
7111 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)-(C) (2000) (absolute priority rule for unsecured claims and interests).
72

See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(1) (2000).
See, e.g., In re Oglesby, 196 B.R. 938 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1996); In re Grand Slam U.S.A., Inc., 178 B.R.
460, 464 (E.D. Mich. 1995) ("[Tlhe subordination provision within [§ 724(b)(2)] is as much 'a legal ...
proceeding [that forces the lien holder] to accept a money satisfaction of such interest' as is the 'cram
down' provision of Section 1129(b)(2)(A).") (citing In re Healthco Int'l Inc., 174 B.R. 174 (Bankr. D. Mass.
1994)); King v. Bd. of Supervisors (In re A.G. Metre, Jr., Inc.), 155 BR. 118 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1994), affd,
16 F.3d 414 (4th Cit. 1994)). As with the use of hypothetical cramdown, not all courts agree that
hypothetical subordination and strip down can be used to satisfy § 363(b)(5). See In re Grand Slam
U.S.A., Inc., 178 B.R. at 463 (quoting bankruptcy court below's rejection of the use of § 724(b)(2) to
satisfy § 363(f)(5)).
74
Eminent domain is an extra-judicial legal procedure under which the condemning entity is authorized
to take private property for public use. The proceedings may be reviewed by a court in an equitable
proceeding, see Heller v. South Williamsport Borough, 74 Pa. D.& C.2d 795, 798 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. 1976);
accord Lone Star Gas Co. v. Ft. Worth, 98 S.W.2d 799 (Tex. App. 1936), and actions to recover compensation for a taking are legal proceedings. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd.,
526 U.S. 687, 709 (1999) (Section 1983 suit to recover for uncompenstated taking is an action at law).
Eminent domain, thus, also raises the issue of whether or not § 363(0's use of the term "proceeding" is
limited to proceedings involving a judge in the first instance. Hewing to the language of the statute would
answer that question in the negative. The proceeding need only be legal or equitable. The branchjudicial, legislative, or executive-or the government actor that institutes or entertains the proceeding
should be irrelevant. See generally 1 JuLIus L. STACKMAN & RUSSEL D. VAN BRUNT, NICHOLS ON
EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.1-1.42 (3d ed. 1988) (tracing history of eminent domain from Roman to modern
times, observing that the power is a reserved 6r inherent power of the state or sovereign, and at
§ 1.142[3], p. 1-58, explaining that, under one of many theories of the nature of eminent domain, exercise
of the power by the state is an in rem action that strips the prior owner of title and leaves that owner
with an in personam claim for compensation).
75
Mattingly, supra note 24. This is exactly Professor Mattingly's point. It has not, however, been
endorsed by any court. The plain language of the statute could be amended to avoid its current potential
broad sweep by specifying a nongovernmental actor instigating the hypothetical proceeding: 'could be
compelled, in a legal or equitable proceeding commenced by a hypothetical non-governmental party, to accept a money satisfaction of the interest." Despite a massive rewrite of the Bankruptcy Code in the
73
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decision, and neither has the leading treatise on bankruptcy law. 76 The rationale for adopting it, however, is clear. The power of eminent domain is used
not just when the government wants to take property for its own use but
when it seeks to redevelop a blighted area by taking the property, compensating the former owner, and then selling or giving the property to a private
developer for a specific purpose. 77 This is constitutionally permissible, at
least within limits. 78 Treating § 363(f)(5) as incorporating the power of eminent domain is no greater a stretch of the concept of taking private property
for a "public" purpose. Substitute "reorganization" for "redevelopment" in the
79
eminent domain case law to see how easily the approach can be supported.
d. Case-By-Case Misinterpretation of § 363(f)(5)
Courts have reasoned that if § 363(f)(5) is read broadly, 0 then § 363(f)
could be vastly simplified by retaining just the first twenty-two of its one
hundred or so words, leaving it to read "The trustee may sell property under
subsection (b) and (c) of this section free and clear of any interest in such
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333 (engrossed in House
March 1, 2001), and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S.R. 420 (engrossed in Senate March 15, 2001),
Congress has not addressed the conflict between the statute's plain meaning and the courts' narrower
interpretation. Neither § 363(e) nor () are amended by either the House or Senate versions.
763 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1363.06 (15th ed., Rev. 1998).
77
See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984) (holding Hawaii Land Reform Act, which
"redeveloped" leasehold estates into fee simple estates, constitutional under the Fifth Amendment);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) (holding constitutional the D.C. Redevelopment Act of 1945, which
provided for redevelopment of slum areas).
7
1See Haw, Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 229. See also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001)
(discussing takings clause and standards applicable to same).
79
See Berman, 348 U.S. 26; but see In re Opinion of Justices, 126 N.E.2d 795, 803 (Mass. 1955) (noting
that the principles of Berman do not apply where the area to be redeveloped is not a slum area); City and
County of San Francisco v. Ross, 279 P.2d 529, 532 (Cal. 1955) (noting that Berman does not apply
where stringent controls are not maintained over the properties that are taken and then sold or leased to
private parties). See generally Julia Patterson Forrester, Bankruptcy Takings, 51 FLA. L. REv. 851 (1999)
(challenging and rejecting Professor Rogers' long-standing view that the Fifth Amendment does not limit
the bankruptcy clause and concluding that the takings clause is a vital consideration in determining the
treatment of secured creditors in bankruptcy); James Steven Rogers, The Impairment of Secured Creditors'
Rights in Reorganization: A Study of the Relationship between the Fifth Amendment and the Bankruptcy
Clause, 96 HARV. L. REV. 973 (1983) (arguing that the bankruptcy clause itself and not the Fifth Amendment limits congressional bankruptcy power).
"°The right case could present an appellate court with the chance to correct the interpretation of
§ 363(0 using a "plain language" approach. See, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235,
249 (1989) ("[W]here, as here, the statute's language is plain, 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce
it according to its terms.'). This could establish § 363's proper scope, applying to all types of interests,
but not to claims, and using § 363(e)'s mandate of adequate protection as the principled limit on the use of
§ 363 to strip off interests. This would effectively force parties seeking to use the Bankruptcy Code to
avoid successor liability to proceed with the plan process, utilizing postconfirmation vesting under § 1141
to block successor liability claims. Such an interpretation would put the genie back in the bottle, confine
§ 363 to its proper scope, and provide those whose interests the debtor or others sought to strip off
through the free and clear process to the full panoply of procedural protections that surround proposal and
confirmation of a plan of reorganization.
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property."8 1 But, since Congress did not enact merely the first twenty-two
words of the statute, the reasoning goes, it must have meant something different from the no-limits plain language interpretation of § 363(f)(5) that could
82
have been more succinctly drafted in twenty-two words.
What the real meaning-rather than the plain one-is and was has been
left to the courts to consider on a case-by-case basis.8 3 Their conclusions
become more clear if examined from the perspective of the particular interests
in question-here claims that would otherwise be assertable against the purchaser of the debtor's assets under applicable state law-instead of further
parsing the language of the statute in the abstract. One can then see how the
courts have expanded the scope of the word 'interests" to include successor
liability claims, promoting use of the statute for a quick sale process that
S'To alleviate the devastatingly broad sound of the pronouncement, the words "subject to the provisions of subsection (e) above" could be added. Although arguably surplus, this would ensure that concerns
regarding the constitutionality of any "taking" under § 363(0 were addressed through the mechanism of
adequate protection. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(e) (2000); see also 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2000) (defining adequate
protection). See generally Ultimate Sports Bar, Inc. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 540 (Fed. Cl. 2001)
(citing Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) ("The bankruptcy power, like the
other great substantive powers of Congress, is subject to the Fifth Amendment.") and discussing the
interplay between bankruptcy law and takings law, noting the adequate protection principle). The Supreme Court's view of how broadly or narrowly to interpret the takings clause in relation to the bankruptcy clause has vacillated over time. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of The Bankruptcy Laws in
the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 48-50 (1995) (tracing history from Louisville Joint Stock
Land Bank to United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70 (1982), regarding this issue).
"2See Richardson v. Pitt County (In re Stroud Wholesale, Inc.), 47 BR. 999 (E.D.N.C. 1985) ("If the
trustee's interpretation was correct there would be no need for (f)()-(1)4). This court can imagine very
few situations where a lienholder could not be forced to accept monetary compensation for a lien on estate
property. It is doubtful that Congress intended for (05 to be given such a broad reading. Therefore, this
court does not believe that 'money satisfaction' means that estate property can be sold free and clear of all
liens whenever those lien holders could be compelled to accept monetary compensation, however slight,
for their liens.") (citation omitted), affd, 983 F.2d 1057 (4th Cir. 1986) (unpublished table decision). Even
if § 363(0(5) is read broadly, this does not necessarily mean that the other subsections are rendered a
nullity. Rather, by specifying which subsection the sale is to be approved under, the trustee or debtor in
possession may be selecting the adequate protection or treatment to be afforded to the interest holder
whose interest is being stripped off the property. For example, if proceeding under state law authorizing
the sale free and clear and terminating the interest with no compensation to the holder, no payment or
other remedy would be ordered under § 363(e)'s mandate of adequate protection. In contrast, if an (f)(5)
eminent domain justification for the same sale were used, then adequate protection would consist of pay,
ment of "just compensation" as developed under that body of law.
3
The process of "judicial legislation" by interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code is nothing new. See
Kenneth N. Klee & Frank A. Merola, Ignoring Congressional Intent: Eight Years of JudicialLegislation, 62
AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 28 (1988) (discussing examples, including the Third Circuit's much criticized decision
Avellino $ Bienes v. M. Frenville Co. (In re M. Frenville Co.), 744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), which
creatively interpreted the word "claim" with distorting ramifications); see also Hon. Leif M. Clark, The
Ripple Effect, 20 AMER. BANKR. INST. J. 31 (July/Aug. 2001) ("[T]he reality of bankruptcy practice is
that it is shaped as much by rulings and practices that are never set out in published opinions as it is by
the cases printed in West's Bankruptcy Reporter. Those rulings and practices in turn grow out of choices
that someone has made that have a ripple effect throughout the system, altering it in ways often more far,
reaching than even a Supreme Court decision.").
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erects a firewall between assets and creditors that is otherwise unavailable
under applicable nonbankruptcy law.
C.

FREE AND CLEAR OF WHAT?

1. Liens
'Liens"-which are closely related to "claims," at least secured onescomprise at least a portion of "interests." Section 363(f) itself refers to liens as
a subset of interests in subsection (3).84 The Bankruptcy Code also provides
a broad and seemingly clear definition of liens: any "charge against or interest
85
in property to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation."
So, "lien" is a subset of "interest," an interest that secures payment or performance of a claim.86 In any event, the definition of "lien" appears to give
courts little difficulty,8 7 and § 363(f) is commonly employed to sell property
free and clear of liens securing payment obligations.88
2. Unsecured Claims
In a dramatic expansion of § 363(0's language into an interpretation that
parallels the language of § 1141(c), some courts have concluded that unsecured 89 claims are a type of "interest" in property from which the property
may be sold free and clear.9o Although fundamentally flawed, this interpreta1411
8511

U.S.C. § 363(f)(3) (2000).
U.S.C. § 101(37) (2000) (emphasis added). This definition of lien is broad enough to encompass

liens in real, personal, tangible, and intangible property, and includes traditional liens by mortgage or deed
of trust, Uniform Commercial Code security interests, and liens and security interests that arise otherwise
by operation of law, such as tax and mechanics' liens.
6
The definition of "claim" is:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated,
unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or
(B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise
to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced
to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured,
or unsecured[.]
11 U.S.C.
§ 101(5) (2000).
87See, e.g., 229 Main Street Ltd. P'ship v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. (In re 229 Main Street Ltd.
P'ship), 262 F.3d 1 (1st Cir 2001) (toxic clean up lien was an interest in property; noting that "interest in
property" is not synonymous with lien insofar as it is a broader term); WBQ P'ship v. Commonwealth of
Va. (In re WBQ P'ship), 189 BR. 97 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) (cogently discussing "lien" as a subset of
"interest"); see also Minstar, Inc. v. Plastech Research, Inc. (In re Arctic Enters., Inc.), 68 BR. 71 (D. Minn.
1986) (construing "interest" under § 1141(c) to include liens).
"SSilverman v. Ankari (In re Oyster Bay Cove, Ltd.), 196 BR. 251, 255 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) ("free and
clear" applied to "interests against the property, such as liens or mortgages" which attach to the proceeds);
In re A. Cardi Constr. Co., 154 BR. 403, 405 (D.R.I. 1993) (free and clear applies to tax liens for "trust
fund" taxes like any other lien).
9
Secured claims are covered by the discussion of sales free and clear of liens at supra notes 84-88 and
accompanying text.
9°See, e.g., United Mine Workers of Am. 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. (In re Leckie
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tion is pervasive and is loudly defended:
State and federal decisions holding a bankruptcy purchaser
liable as a successor of the debtor are directly at odds with
Congressional intent to allow a debtor to sell its assets free
and clear of all claims and interests therein. This conflict
poses a constitutional dilemma that must be resolved in favor
of the specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Absent
evidence of collusion or strong public policy concerns enunciated by Congress, a bankruptcy purchaser should not be held
liable for a debtor's obligations. Any further extension of
successor liability in the bankruptcy context is a policy decision best implemented by Congress pursuant to its exclusive
jurisdiction over the subject of bankruptcy. 91
This interpretation also has powerful consequences, primarily the use of a
Smokeless Coal Co.), 99 F.3d 573, 582 (4th Cir. 1996) ("Yet while the plain meaning of the phrase
'interest in such property' suggests that not all general rights to payment are encompassed by the statute,
Congress did not expressly indicate that, by employing such language, it intended to limit the scope of
section 363(0 to in rem interests, strictly defined, and we decline to adopt such a restricted reading of the
statute here."); P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc. v. Commonwealth of Va. (In re P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs.,
Inc.), 189 B.R. 90, 94 & n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995) ('Under a § 363(0 sale, the purchaser acquires the
property free and clear of all interests. Thus, the sale extinguishes [a general unsecured creditor's] interest
in the property because [general unsecured creditor's] interest attaches to the proceeds of the sale ....[the
creditor] possesses a contingent, unsecured, nonpriority claim."). Not all courts have embraced this argu,
ment, although at least one has found another route to the same result. See infra notes 108-12 and accom,
panying text (discussing the Fairchild Aircraft approach and rejecting it as equally unsupported in the
majority of cases). Putting aside the thorny problem of future claims, i.e. those that have not yet arisen,
such as a future wrongful death action arising out of a future use of a product manufactured defectively by
a debtor prepetition, the cases are fairly consistent, in holding that a preplan sale can be free and clear of
existing claims held by creditors that receive notice. See, e.g., Walker v. Lee (In re Rounds), 229 B.R. 758,
763 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 1999) ("[E]ven notwithstanding the Code's concern for finality in bankruptcy
sales, it 'will not .. .protect a [buyer] .. .where no notice [was] given to the lienholder[;] [s]uch a
purchaser will be held to have purchased subject to the lien.") (citation omitted); In re Burd, 202 B.R. 590,
593 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1996) ("[A] trustee, [or] the debtor-in-possession .. .may sell properties of the
estate free and clear of liens by merely complying with the notice requirements of Bankruptcy Rule
2002(a)(2), (c)(1) and can effectively conclude the sale free and clear of any liens and encumbrances of all
parties who were properly notified and given an opportunity to object.").
9
iHon. William T. Bodoh & Michelle M. Morgan, Inequality Among Creditors: The Unconstitutional
Use of Successor Liability to Create a New Class of Priority Claimants, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 325
(1996). Judge Bodoh and Ms. Morgan failed to note that § 363(0's "specific provisions" nowhere refer to
"claims." Their point based upon notions of broad federal preemption is well taken in terms of free and
clear sales accomplished using § 1141(c) and a confirmed plan to vest property free and clear of prior
claims. The NBRC's final report stated that whether or not § 363(0 could be used to sell property free
and clear of claims was unclear under the current statute, and proposed that the matter be addressed in
upcoming amendments. NBRC Report, supra note 9, Recommendation 2.4.12, p. 23 (October 27, 1997).
The currently pending House and Senate versions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333 (engrossed in House March 1, 2001) and The Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 2001, S.R.420 (engrossed in Senate March 15, 2001), do not address the matter.
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preplan sale using § 363(0 to purportedly cut off successor liability that,
under applicable nonbankruptcy law, could lie against the purchaser after a
sale of substantially all the assets of a business. 92 Successor liability may
92

The general rule is that a purchaser of assets for fair consideration does not become liable for the
seller's liabilities, even when the purchaser purchases substantially all of the assets of the seller. See
Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 14 Cal. App. 3d 767, 780 (1971), disapproved, Ray v. Alad Corp., 560
P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977); Husak v. Berkel, Inc., 341 A.2d 174, 176 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) ("Ordinarily when
one company sells or transfers all its assets to another company, the latter is not liable for the debts and
liabilities of the transferor simply by virtue of its succession to the transferor's property."); Schumacher v.
Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 1983) ("It is the general rule that a corporation which
acquires the assets of another is not liable for the torts of its predecessor."); Dana Corp. v. LTV Corp., 668
A.2d 752, 756 (Del. Ch.) (A successor "will be exposed to liability only if a court follows some exception
to the traditional rule that a transfer of assets does not pass liabilities unless the transferee agrees to
assume them."), affd, 670 A.2d 1337 (Del. Super. Ct. 1995) (unpublished table decision). Absent fraudulent transfers, acquisition of all or substantially all of a company's assets is a necessary but, by itself,
insufficient element for a finding of successor liability. Acheson v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 523 F.2d 1327,
1330 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding no successor liability as purchaser had not acquired accounts, customer lists,
trade names or goodwill); see also McGraw-Edison, 14 Cal. App. 3d at 781 (purchaser who did not acquire
substantially all of a business and who paid valuable and adequate consideration was not liable in tort for
defective products manufactured by a seller that continued to exist as a separate corporate entity with
substantial assets to meet its debts). Where exceptions to the general rule of no-successorliability-forasset-purchasers are accepted, they typically require an additional element over mere acquisition of substantially all the assets of an entity to impose successor liability. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS
§ 12 (1998) (collecting and discussing authorities). The findings that can constitute the additional element
needed to impose successor liability on an asset purchaser include:
(1) An express or implied assumption of liabilities in the purchase agreement. See,
e.g., Kessinger v. Grefco, Inc., 875 F.2d 153 (7th Cir. 1989) (asset purchaser im,
pliedly assumed a seller's unforeseen liability for certain tort claims where the purchaser agreed "'to pay, perform and discharge all debts, obligations, contracts and
liabilities" of the seller); Schwartz v. Pillsbury, Inc., 969 F.2d 840, 845 (9th Cir.
1992) (asset purchaser that acquired franchiser did not expressly or impliedly assume seller's tort liability when acquisition agreement expressly limited obligations
assumed to certain specified contracts and agreements of seller); Carlos R. Leffler,
Inc. v. Hurter, 696 A.2d 157 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (asset purchaser impliedly as,
sumed a liability where other liabilities were expressly assumed); or
(2) A transaction amounting to a consolidation or a "de facto merger." See, e.g.,
Marks v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 187 Cal. App. 3d 1429, 1435-36 (1986) (de
facto merger found where one corporation takes all of another's assets without providing any consideration to meet the claims of the seller's creditors; four factor test
for de facto merger: (i) the purchaser continues the same enterprise after the sale; (ii)
shareholders of the seller corporation become shareholders of the purchaser; (iii) the
seller liquidates; and (iv) the buyer assumes the liabilities of the seller necessary to
carry on the business); Sweatland v. Park Corp., 587 N.Y.S.2d 54, 56 (App. Div.
1992) (de facto merger factors include continuity of ownership, liquidation of prede,
cessor, assumption of liabilities needed to carry on the business, and continuity of
management, personnel, physical location, assets and general operations); Drug, Inc.
v. Hunt, 168 A. 87 (Del. 1933) (where consideration for transfer of assets was stock
in transferee and transferee assumed all debts and liabilities of the transferor, there
was a de facto merger); or
(3) The purchasing corporation is "merely a continuation" of the seller. See, e.g.,
Stanford Hotel Co. v. M. Schwind Co., 181 P. 780 (Cal. 1919) ("mere continuation" successor liability may lie when: (1) no adequate consideration was given for
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appear on first blush to be an interest in property because the liability ap,
pears to follow the property to the purchaser. However, a review of the
exceptions to the general rule of no-liability-for-asset-purchasers that, taken
together, constitute successor liability, reveals this to be an incorrect charac-

the acquired assets, and (2) where one or more persons were officers, directors, or
stockholders of both corporations); Bostick v. Schall's Brakes & Repairs, Inc., 725
A.2d 1232 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (reversing summary judgment and remanding for
determination of whether successor was established to merely continue the former
corporation's operations); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873
(Mich. 1976) ('Continuity is the purpose, continuity is the watchword, continuity
is the fact."); or
(4) The transfer of assets to the purchaser is for the fraudulent purpose of escaping
liability for the seller's debts. See, e.g., Reddy v. Gonzalez, 8 Cal. App. 4th 118, 122
(1992) (under uniform fraudulent transfer act actual intent and inadequate consideration are alternative requirements for successor liability based upon fraudulent
transfer); Schmoll v. ACandS, Inc., 703 F. Supp. 868 (D. Or. 1988) (finding corpo,
rate restructuring was undertaken to avoid liabilities from asbestos claimants and
imposing liability on transferee), affd, 977 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Husak,
341 A.2d at 176 (using inadequate consideration paid as alternative factor implying
fraudulent purpose, much like constructive fraudulent conveyance theories of recovery); or
(5) In the seminal case of Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977), California's
courts introduced the "product line" exception, imposing liability on an asset pur,
chaser that continued production of the transferor's product line with the assets
purchased. Since that time courts in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Washington, Mississippi, New Mexico and New York have adopted the product line exception, and
those of Ohio, Virginia, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Maine, Connecticut, New
Hampshire, Iowa, Texas, Georgia, Kansas, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska,
Oklahoma, Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, Florida, Colorado,
Illinois, Oregon, and the District of Columbia have rejected it. See Harris v. T.I.,
Inc., 413 S.E.2d 605 (Va. 1992); Huff v. Shopsmith, Inc., 786 So.2d 383, 388 (Miss.
2001) (recognizing product line theory as a viable basis for recovery); Garcia v. Coe
Mfg., Co., 933 P.2d 243 (N.M. 1997) (adopting product line theory from Ray v.
Alad); Hart v. Bruno Mach. Corp., 679 N.Y.S.2d 740, 742-43 (App. Div. 1998)
(applying product line theory); accord Dawejko v. Jorgenson Steel Co., 434 A.2d
106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); cf. City of New York v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 688
N.Y.S.2d 23 (App. Div. 1999) (declining to adopt the product line theory of Ray v.
Alad); accord Jordan v. Hawker Dayton Corp., 62 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 1995) (Maine);
Pesce v. Overhead Door Corp., No. 2-91-CV-00435, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20665
(D. Conn. 1998); Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, Inc., 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.
1985); Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 328 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 1985); Stratton v.
Garvey Int'l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984); Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool
Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co.,
709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press. Co. of
Elkart, Ind., 320 N.W.2d 481 (Neb. 1982); Goucher v. Parmac, Inc., 694 P.2d 953
(Okla. Ct. App. 1984); Hamaker v. Kenwel-Jackson Mach., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 515
(S.D. 1986); see also Jeffrey Davis, Cramming Down Future Claims in Bankruptcy:
Fairness,Bankruptcy Policy, Due Process, and the Lessons of the Piper Reorganization, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 329 (1996) (collecting cases).
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terization. 93 Successor liability arises out of the actions of the purchaser, not
the property itself. For example, the successor liability doctrine of express or
implied assumption of liability 94 is rooted in the actions of the purchaser
(agreeing or appearing to agree to assume liability). Similarly, when a de facto
merger is found,9 5 or mere continuation of an enterprise 96 justifies imposing
successor liability, it is the purchaser's postsale conduct (in continuing the
business in substantially the same form and manner) that gives rise to liability. The same is true for successor liability founded upon fraudulent transfer 97 and continued manufacture of a product line.98 All these successor
liability doctrines are grounded upon acts or implications from acts of the
purchaser,not the property.
Further revealing the in personam nature of successor liability, if the assets are not sold as a unit but are nonfraudulently spread upon the wind to a
variety of purchasers that put them to a variety of uses, successor liability
will not lie. 99 An alternative to viewing the liability as arising out of the
actions of the purchaser is to view it as arising out of the business that is
conducted with the assets involved (by the purchaser). The focus of the
inquiry is, again, not on the assets themselves, but on what is being done with
them and by whom. Once the purchaser's conduct or the use of the assets to
operate a business fits an applicable doctrine imposing successor liability, that
liability is not capped at the value of the assets (unless, of course, those assets
are the sole assets of the purchaser). As a result, successor liability claims are
not properly viewed as in rem claims that can be included within the Code's
term "interest" or "interest in property" or stripped off under § 363(0.100
Interpreting § 363(0 to allow preplan sales free and clear of claims also
expands the number of cases in which such a sale can take place. Because
Chapter 7 trustees operate in a nonplan environment,' 01 if the power to sell
free and clear of claims were confined to vesting of title under a confirmed
plan and § 1141(c), trustees would not be able to conduct sales free and clear
of claims.102 Unlike most benefits created by the Code, this power to shield
9'See supra note 92 (collecting exceptions to general rule of no successor liability for purchasers of
assets).
4

See supra note 92 subparagraph (1).
'See supra note 92 subparagraph (2).
96
See supra note 92 subparagraph (3).
97
See supra note 92 subparagraph (4).
98
See supra note 92 subparagraph (5).
'See supra note 92.
' 00 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(0 (2000) (sale free and clear of "any interest"); 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2000)
(vesting "free and clear of all claims and interests"). See also supra notes 13,29 and accompanying text.
10111 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (2000) (Chapter 7 is devoid of plan provisions).
02
1 This, in turn, might depress the prices that trustees would realize from sales, arguably impacting
negatively on unsecured creditors. This negative impact, however, is the product of correctly interpreting
the statute as enacted and erasing a judicial gloss that has, perhaps, produced a windfall for unsecured
9
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purchasers from successor liability only indirectly benefits debtors and their
creditors, by arguably increasing the price that purchasers are willing to pay
for the assets involved, and instead directly and substantially benefits the
third-party purchaser, who may otherwise be a complete stranger to the
case. 10 3 This expansive interpretation of § 363(f) may not just go beyond the
plain language of the statute, it may be unconstitutional.104
a. Section 363 Only Refers to Interests and, Properly Viewed,
a Claim is Not an Interest
Outside of bankruptcy, an unsecured claim, including a successor liability
claim, has no relationship to any of the debtor's property unless it is sold
fraudulently or as an enterprise. It is, therefore, merely an in personam claim
against the debtor, unless, by virtue of being sold as a business unit, applicable nonbankruptcy law "tags" the purchaser with the liabilities of the seller,
in which case it is an in personam claim against the purchaser as well.105 It
can be converted into an in rem secured claim by agreement or through the
creditors. This windfall has largely been small to nonexistent as distributions to unsecured creditors in
Chapter 7 cases are so small that it is questionable whether, from that perspective, the cost of the Chapter
7 system is worth it at all. See Marcy J. K. Tiffany, Is Chapter 7 Cost Effective? An Analysis of Trustee
Distribution Statistics in Region 16 for CalenderYear 1996, 25 CAL. BANKR. J. 33, 40-41 (1999) ("It thus
follows that an enormously disproportionate percentage of governmental resources are being devoted to
administering a huge number of cases that, overall, return relatively little to unsecured creditors .... In a
very real sense, the administration of a large number of relatively small Chapter 7 asset cases results in
little more than wealth redistribution, not from the debtors to their creditors, but from the unsecured
creditors to the trustees, attorneys, and other professionals who administer the cases.").
"'SOne reviewer of an earlier draft of this Article speculated that, based upon economic theory, a
purchaser should be willing to pay more for the property free from liability than they would otherwise,
and that the higher purchase price would benefit creditors. Theoretically, and assuming something approaching a perfect market, this is true. In the author's experience, however, outside of the mass tort case,
this is not the case in practice. The ability to sell free and clear has the primary effect of enticing a
purchaser to consider a transaction that might otherwise be ignored because it has too much "hair" on it.
Once the purchaser entertains the transaction, little value is, at least expressly, attributed to the free and
clear nature of the sale. Further, the bankruptcy sale process is not a perfect market in any sense. There is
no perfect information, no multitude of willing buyers and sellers, and no absence of a compulsion to buy
or sell. The process is often controlled by insiders and secured creditors who, in reality, have other things
on their minds than increasing returns to unsecured creditors. This, combined with the use of blanket
liens in prepetition secured financing means that whatever excess value the purchaser does attribute to the
free and clear nature of the sale will generally not trickle down below the ranks of the secured creditors
and administrative claimants. The one exception to this would be in precisely the area where it is fairly
clear that the free and clear process cannot shield the purchaser: future claims. See infra notes 121 & 123
and accompanying text (discussing early view that future claims could be cut off and more recent and
better reasoned view that they cannot be cut off consistent with due process under the current statute).
i" 4Thomas E. Plank, The Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy, 63 TENN. L. Rsv. 487, 565 (1996)
('Faced with ambiguous language, courts have also interpreted the Code to provide direct benefits to or
impose harms on these third parties in the name of fostering the reorganization of an insolvent debtor.
When Congress and the courts create these benefits or impose these harms in the name of the 'subject of
Bankruptcies,' they exceed their constitutional authority.").
"Nathan F. Coco, Note, An Examination of Successor Liability in the Post-Bankruptcy Context, 22 J.
CoRp. L. 345, 353 (1997).
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lawsuit-judgment-lien process of nonbankruptcy law. Until that is done,
however, the claim is merely an unsecured claim, and should not properly be
characterized as an interest. 10 6 The result should be no different inside bankruptcy absent an express statutory grant of the power to sell or vest assets
free and clear of claims, like the one found in § 1141(c) that is absent in
§ 363(0. Because § 363(0 refers only to sales free and clear of interests in
property, not claims, the preplan power of sale free and clear should not be
construed to block claims of successor liability that would otherwise lie
10 7
under applicable nonbankruptcy statutory and common law.
b. In Practice, Sales are Free and Clear of Claims and Interests
Making the analytical leap to the conclusion that claims are a subset of
interests 0" has conveniently allowed preplan sales free and clear of interests
and claims under § 363(0. Alternatively, some have reasoned that, since successor liability claims are dependent upon the liability of the entity that is
selling the assets, the bankruptcy court can discharge the underlying debtor
liability, effectively cutting off the source of the successor's liability. As
Bankruptcy Judge Clark states in his later self-vacated opinion in In re
FairchildAircraft Corporation,
...if the predecessor has a valid affirmative defense to the
claim as of the [time of the] sale of the assets, then the suc106Id.
at 356.
7
1d. Mr. Coco notes, appropriately, the due process problems that arise when one allows §,363(f)
sales to be free and clear of successor liability claims. He fails, however, to note the existence of § 1141(c)

and the power to vest properly free and clear of claims under a confirmed plan. This omission leads him to
the incorrect conclusion that the Bankruptcy Code can never be used to cleanse business assets of successor liability. See id. at 365-66. To address his valid due process concerns, however, sales free and clear of
claims should properly be limited to those conducted under a confirmed plan, using § 1141's explicit grant
of authority to vest free and clear of interests and claims. This would provide a better, and more dueprocess compliant, mechanism for addressing successor liability claims, including those of unknown claimants, than the contested-matter motion process applicable to § 363 sales. See Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v.
Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 BR. 910 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995), vacated by 220 B.R. 909
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998) (discussing future claim problems from a due process perspective); see also Frederick Tung, Taking Future Claims Seriously: Future Claims and Successor Liability in Bankruptcy, 49
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 435 (1999) (collecting authorities and addressing the problems posed by unknown
future claims and claimants). The detailed and lengthy provisions of Bankruptcy Code §§ 1121-1129
coupled with Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 2019, 3013, and 3016-3020, provide a multi-step process that
should be more than adequate to protect successor liability claimants, at least those that can be currently
identified by the debtor or themselves. See generally Davis, supra note 92, 5 (discussing and analyzing due
process concerns in confirmation process to address future claims and successor liability).
i"SThe leap appears driven by the observation that successor liability rights follow the property-but
this does not make it an in rein claim. Reviewing the development of successor liability under judge-made
law, it is more a case of the claims following the business, not the property. See In re Fairchild Aircraft
Corp., 184 B.R. at 920,21 ("[W]hile successor liability may give a party an alternative entity from whom
to recover, the doctrine does not convert the claim to an in rein action running against the property being
sold." Nor does the claim have an existence independent of the underlying liability of the entity that sold
the assets.)
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cessor will be able to assert that same defense as a bar to
liability.... Discharge in bankruptcy is but another affirmative defense, as would be a court-ordered sale of assets pur109
suant to section 363(b).
Judge Clark's reasoning is persuasive, yet he too must make an unsupported analytical leap in order for a § 363(b) sale to cut off successor liability.
Either the Code must provide for a discharge of the debtor upon sale of assets
(it does not), or the sale process must take place under a confirmed plan in a
case where the debtor is entitled to a discharge (which excludes, inter alia,
artificial entity liquidation cases-the likely context of sales of substantially
all of a business debtor's assets). 11° Whether one proceeds by the "interestsincludes-claims" reasoning or this "affirmative-defense-at-time-of-sale" approach, one is making an analytical leap that is not supported by the Code's
plain language to allow preplan sales free and clear of claims. Judge Clark's
approach, however, does serve as additional support for effecting a sale of
assets free and clear of successor liability and other claims under a confirmed
plan in a case in which the debtor is entitled to a discharge. Interestingly,
coupled with § 1141(c), this line of reasoning supports prosecution of reorganization cases under Chapter 11 as Congress originally intended: through
the plan process, not through preplan sales.
Either approach-the inclusion of "claims" within "interests" in § 363(0
or providing the purchaser with the protection of the debtor's discharge"' allows purchasers to be protected from successor liability without having to
navigate through the plan proposal and confirmation process that would allow use of § 1141(c)'s plain meaning to accomplish the same end.
In essence, and perhaps without intending to do so, the courts have concluded that the procedural due process that Congress determined was owed
to creditors and other parties in interest faced with a sale free and clear of
claims is too much. 1 2 The statute, as written, requires the plan confirmation
process to activate the sale and vesting provisions of §§ 1123 and 1141. The
921 n.11.
..See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (2000).
"nWhether application of Judge Clark's discharge-the-debtorto-dischargethe-purchaser approach
would survive a § 524(e) challenge is unknown. Section 524(e) provides that (with exceptions that are
not pertinent here): 'discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any other entity on,
or the property of any other entity for, such debt." 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) (2000). No cases have been
reported addressing the issue. Some courts interpret § 524 broadly, see Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche
Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d 621 (9th Cir. 1989); some narrowly. See Class Five
Nevada Claimants v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648 (6th Cir. 2002), pet.
for cert. filed, 70 U.S.L.W. 3726 (U.S. Apr. 29, 2002) (No. 01-1686).
" See generally Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) ("[O]ne can say in fact, that the question of
which specific safeguards of the Constitution are appropriately to be applied in a particular context ... can
be reduced to the issue of what process is 'due.") (Harlan, J., concurring).
""See, e.g.,
id. at
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courts have accepted the mere motion practice process of Rule 4001 to effect
sales free and clear of claims and interests under § 363(f). This is an interesting reversal of the traditional roles of these two bodies. Historically it has
usually been Congress that has legislated inadequate process and the courts
13
that have rejected this attempt under the rubric of lack of due process.'
Despite § 363(f)'s explicit reference to sales free and clear solely of "interests," 1 4 these sales are commonly referred to as sales free and clear of "claims
and interests." 115 Bankruptcy courts enter extensive findings of fact and conclusions of law supporting § 363(f) sale orders that commonly contain de1 6
tailed provisions insulating the purchaser from liability. '
1

'See, e.g., McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 37, 39 (1877) (syllabus) ("Although taxes may be collected

summarily and without the aid of the courts, there must be due process of some kind. It is not in the
power
of the legislature to make any process due process of law.").
1t4
When the statute addresses claims and interests, it does so explicitly. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1141(c)
(2000) (property dealt with under confirmed plan of reorganization passes free and clear of "all claims and
interests"); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1327(c) (2000) (accord). Interpreting "interest" to include "claims- makes
the use of the phrase "claims and interests" two-thirds surplus, in terms of word count, both as used in the
statute and as used in practice. See infra note 115 (containing titles of typical orders approving sale free
and clear). The statute was carefully worded, and the use of specific terms should be honored. Cf United
States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 n.5 (1989) ("When Congress wanted to restrict the
application of a particular provision of the Code to [voluntary] liens, it used the term 'security interest.'").
iisSee, e.g., Novon Int'l, Inc. v. Novamont S.P.A., Nos. 98-CV0677E(F), 96-BK-15463B, 2000 W.L.
432848 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2000) (quoting sale order referring to transfer property "free and clear of all
liens, claims and encumbrances"); In re Einstein/Noah Bagel Corp., Nos. 00-04447-ECF-CGC and 0004448-ECF-CCC, Order under §§ 105(a), 363(b), (0, (m), and (n), 365 and 1146(c), and Fed. R. Bankr. P.
2002, 6004, 6006, and 9014, Authorizing (A) Sale of Substantially All Assets of the Debtors Free and
Clear of Liens, Claims, Encumbrances, and other Interests, (B) Assumption and Assignment of Certain
Non-Residential Real Property Leases and Executory Contracts, (C) Assumption of Certain Debts, and
(D) Related Relief (Bankr. D. Az. June 1, 2001) (unpublished decision) (on file with court and author)
[hereinafter "Einstein/Noah Bagel Order"]; In re FPA Med. Mgmt., Inc., et al., No. 98-1596 (PJW)
through 98-1685 (PJW), Order and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Under §§ 105, 363, 365,
and 1146(c) and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 6004 and 9014, (A) Approving Asset Sale Agreement and Termination
Fee In Connection Therewith, (B) Authorizing Sale of Orange Coast Assets Free and Clear of Liens,
Claims, Encumbrances, and Interests, and Determining that Such Sale Is Exempt from Any Stamp, Transfer, Recording, or Similar Tax, (C) Authorizing Procedures to Reject or Assume and Assign Certain
Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases and (D) Granting Related Relief, at 5, pp. 11-12 (Bankr. D.
Del. Sept. 23, 1998) (unpublished decision) (on file with court, docket n.740, and author) [hereinafter
"FPA Order"]. The use of § 1146(c), which exempts transfers under a confirmed plan of reorganization
from stamp and similar taxes, in preplan sale transactions is another interesting stretch-or blatant violation-of the statute, but is beyond the scope of this Article. See In re Automationsolutions Int'l, LLC,
274 B.R. 527 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (striking provisions of proposed order approving sale that attempted
to use § 1146(c) to avoid taxes).
i'In practice these findings of fact and conclusions of law are drafted by the debtor's counsel and the
purchaser's counsel, who insert detailed provisions to insulate their clients and themselves from liability.
Consider the following finding of fact and conclusion of law from a § 363 sale order, which is typical:
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Code sections 105(a) and 363(f), upon the closing under
the Agreement, [the purchaser] shall acquire all title, right, and interest in the
[purchased assets], subject only to the Assumed Liabilities (as defined in the Agreement). The [purchased assets] shall be free and clear of (a) all Encumbrances and
Other Interests, and (b) all debts arising in any way in connection with any acts, or
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Given the breadth of these findings and conclusions, it is preferable for
the free and clear power to emanate from § 363 rather than merely relying
upon § 105(a), the Bankruptcy Code's "all writs" provision"17 to protect the
order and findings from vulnerability on appeal. 1i 8 This practice is national
failures to act, of the Debtors or the Debtors predecessors or affiliates, claims (as
that term is defined in the Bankruptcy Code), obligations, demands, guaranties, options, rights, contractual commitments, restrictions, interests, and matters of any
kind and nature, whether arising prior to or subsequent to the commencement of
these cases, and whether imposed by agreement, understanding, law, equity or otherwise (collectively, the "Claims"), with all such Encumbrances, Other Interests,
and Claims to attach to the net proceeds of the sale of the [purchased assets] in the
order of their priority, with the same validity, force, and effect which they now
have as against the [purchased assets], subject to any claims and defenses the Debtors may possess with respect thereto.
FPA Order, supra note 115, at 5, pp. 11-12 (items in square brackets are generic references that replace
specific names in the order). This free and clear language is far broader than the free and clear of interest
language of Bankruptcy Code § 363(0 and the free and clear of claims and interest language of § 1141(c)
even after discounting the lawyerly tendency to draft in a style of excess and repetition. See also Einstein/
Noah Bagel Order, supra note 115 (substantially similar provision) accomplishing free and clear of claims
result by defining "Interests" as "all liens, claims, encumbrances, and other interests," at p. 2, In. 8-9;
Precision Industries, Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC, No. IPOO,0247-C-H/G, 2001 W.L. 699881, at *3
(S.D. Ind. Apr. 24, 2001) (quoting sale order provisions for sale "free and clear of all liens, claims, encumbrances and interests except [named exceptions]" and enjoining "all persons and entities holding or asserting liens, claims, encumbrances or interests" from asserting those items against, among others, the
purchaser, its sucessors in interest or the assets sold). One court has recently examined the self-serving
excesses of these kinds of sale comfort orders and found many of their provisions to be not only improper
but unenforceable and not entitled to preclusive effect in later proceedings if they were not necessarily
determined in the sale motion proceeding. See In re Automationsolutions Int'l, LLC, 274 B.R. 527 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 2002). Such judicial scrutiny is both commendable and appropriate. A cynical but predictable
reaction to Automationsolutions is that it will encourage development of a new comfort provision: a
finding of fact that all findings and provisions of the order address matters that were necessarily determined in the sale motion proceeding (perhaps on the basis that, without the overreaching provisions of the
comfort order and findings, the buyer would walk away from the transaction or only offer a lower price).
One solution would be for bankruptcy judges to actively draft the terms of their orders, with the comment
of the parties instead of the other way around.
i7Section 105(a) provides:
The court may issue any order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title. No provision of this title providing for
the raising of an issue by a party in interest shall be construed to preclude the court
from, sua sponte, taking any action or making any determination necessary or appropriate to enforce or implement court orders or rules, or to prevent abuse of process.
11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000).
'SSection 105 is a fallback equitable power provision used to plug what would otherwise be gaps in
the statutory scheme, but § 105's grant of power is limited if other portions of title 11 address a subject
scheme. See Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (holding that § 105 should
be used sparingly and it is not a wideranging grant of equitable powers); seealso 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2000)
(prohibition of discharge of debts of nondebtor entities, which would presumably include purchasers); but
seeFairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Cambell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 933 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1995) (noting that § 105 injunction can be used to block claims of successor liability but cannot bind
future claimants who do not yet hold "claims" and are not part of the plan or sale process), vacated by 220
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in scope. 119
Thus, although there is no indication that § 363(f) was intended to be
used to bar successor liability claims, 120 and it is equally clear that § 1141(c)
provides a plan confirmation process to achieve this same end, 121 the domi
nant interpretation is that § 363(f) can be used to sell property free and clear
of claims that could otherwise be assertable against the buyer of the assets
under the common law doctrine of successor liability.' 22 Courts have taken a
similar position with regard to statutory successor liability claims123 such as
B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998); see generally Davis, supra note 92, 5 (reviewing and analyzing succes,
sor liability, futire claim problem, and evolution of case law in this regard).
I 9See supra notes 114 and 115 (discussing titles and terms of sale orders in four cases, one in Arizona,
one in California, one in New York, and one in Delaware).
5

"°H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963 (bill and Legislative history
upon enactment are devoid of references to successor liability). While courts have expressed disbelief over
a plain language reading of § 363(0 in terms of the scope of true property interests that can be stripped
away and the hypothetical proceedings that can be used to satisfy § 363(f)(5), see, e.g., Kuney, supra note
2, they have readily accepted a reading of the statute that includes the words "claims and" which nowhere
appear in the statute. They only balk (sometimes) at the prospect of stripping off the claims of future,
unidentifiable claimants on grounds of due process given the inability to give meaningful notice to those
claimants. See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 B.R. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.), affd sub nom. Epstein v. Official
Comm. of Undersecured Creditors (In re Piper Aircraft Corp.), 168 B.R. 434 (S.D. Fla. 1994), affd as
modified, 58 F.3d 1573 (11th Cir. 1995); In re FairchildAircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910.
12111 U.S.C. § 1141(c) (2000); see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text (use of 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b) or § 1141(c) to extinguish interests).
122The courts have long embraced the concept that "claims" are a subset of "interests," apparently
without much thought or analysis. See, e.g., Forde v. Kee-Lox Mfg. Co., 437 F. Supp. 631(W.D.N.Y. 1977)
(sale free and clear bars civil rights suit based upon pre-sale conduct of business), affd, 584 F.2d 4 (2d Cir.
1978); In re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (indemnification and contribution
claims impliedly considered an interest); Am. Living Sys. v. Bonapfel (In re All Am. of Ashburn, Inc.), 56
B.R. 186 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1986) (assets had been sold free and clear of interests, including successor
liability claims; collecting cases concluding that claims are a subset of interests), affd, 805 F.2d 1515 (11th
Cir. 1986); Paris Mfg. Corp. v. Ace Hardware Corp. (In re Paris Indus. Corp.), 132 B.R. 504 (Bankr. D.
Me. 1991) (remark in dicta that sale free and clear of future claims would be consistent with policies of the
Bankruptcy Code); but see W. Auto Supply Co. v. Savage Arms, Inc. (In re Savage Indus., Inc.), 43 F.3d
714 (1st Cir. 1994) (denial of injunction to ban suit by holder of presale claim against purchaser of debtor's
assets due to lack of notice to claimant and lack of showing that successor liability action posed a genuine
threat to the legitimate operation of the Bankruptcy Code). The reaction of practitioners to Savage Arms
has been predictable: increased attention to wide notice, including notice by publication, and inclusion of a
selfserving finding in § 363(0 sale orders establishing the 'necessity" of a bar to successor liability to
consummate the sale. See, e.g., 1 WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, REORGANIZING FAILING BuSINESSES
11-25 (ABA 1998). The one limit on sales free and clear of claims that appears to have arisen is that
claimants whose claims first arise postsale will not be barred by the free and clear provisions of the sale
order. See In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1573 (establishing "Piper Test" stating that, to be barred by
sales free and clear order, claim must be based upon debtor's prepetition activities and "events occurring
before confirmation [or preplan sale?] creating a relationship, such as contact, exposure, impact or privity
between the claimant and the debtor's product"); accord In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. at 933.
1i3Significant areas of successor liability under state and federal law include sales and employment
taxes, bulk sales without proper notice (U.C.C. article 6), CERCLA claims (42 U.S.C. §§ 96101 et seq.),
and WARN Act claims (29 U.S.C. §§ 2101 et seq.).
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employment benefit claims.124 Section 363(f) has been used to bar tort claims
that arise postsale from the use of a product manufactured presale or prepetition, although this use is questionable in light of more recent cases. 125 It was
2

1 4Section 363(0 has been used successfully to avoid liability under federal labor law. See Steinbach v.

Hubbard, 51 F.3d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1995) (successor liability under federal labor laws generally arises
when: (1) the purchaser continues operation of the business, (ii) the purchaser had notice of the potential
liability, (iii) recovery from the seller is unavailable, and (iv) notions of equity and fairness support imposing liability); but see Chicago Truck Drivers Union (Independent) Pension Fund v. Tasemkin, Inc., 59 F.3d
48 (7th Cir. 1995) (bankruptcy proceeding was not an absolute bar to finding successor liability against
new company that emerged from Chapter 7 bankruptcy with old company's assets).
In United Mine Workers of Am. 1992 Benefit Plan v. Leckie Smokeless Coal Co. (In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co.), 99 F.3d 573 (4th Cir. 1996), the court held that Chapter 11 coal mine operators could sell
their assets free and clear of the debtors' obligations to their workers' benefits plan, which would otherwise have passed on to the asset purchasers under the Coal Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992.
In reaching that decision, the court rejected both a narrow interpretation that would "limit the scope of
section 363(0 to in rein interests," as well as a broad interpretation recognizing an "interest" in the debtor's
property 'simply when one has a right to demand money from the debtor," i.e. an unsecured claim. Id. at
581-82. Apparently recognizing the thorny problem it was confronting and the lack of concrete guidance
from the Code, legislative history or case law, the Seventh Circuit concluded by refusing to further define
the words "interest in" leaving that task to future cases. Id. at 582. Rather than arising in the early life of
the statute, where courts are likely to tread cautiously and allow categorical definitions to develop on a
case-bycase basis, here the Fourth Circuit was confronting a fundamental definitional issue some seventeen years after the Bankruptcy Code was enacted. Viewing the question in the abstract, one would have
expected those seventeen years to have led to a better understanding of the word "interest," to aid the
court of appeals. See also Ninth Avenue Remedial Group v. AllisChalmers Corp., 195 B.R. 716 (N.D. Ind.
1996) (treating elimination of successor liability as a matter of discharging claims and concluding that all
claims that could have been discharged may be stripped off in a sale free and clear); In re Creative Restau,
rant Mgmt., Inc., 141 B.R. 173 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.) (holding sale free and clear of NLRB claim was permitted), vacated on other grounds, 150 B.R. 232 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992); Rubinstein v. Alaska Pac.
Consortium (In re New England Fish Co.), 19 B.R. 323 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982) (sale free and clear of
employment discrimination and civil rights claims). The Ninth Avenue court's reasoning is suspect in light
of the bar to discharge for liquidating noncorporeal entities such as corporations, partnerships, and limited
liability companies. See 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2000); 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (2000). These cases and others
addressing different forms of successor liability show just how wrong or naive the court was in the New
England Fish Company case when it stated:
The apprehension that bankruptcy will become a convenient expedient for avoiding
the successorship doctrine is not well founded. The adverse consequences of bank,
ruptcies involving displacement of management, creditor control and liquidation
hardly support the argument that employers will use bankruptcy to avoid their
responsibilities ....
19 B.R. at 329.
"'Cases supporting sale free and clear to bar future claims include In re Paris Indus. Corp., 132 B.R.
504 (D. Me. 1991) (tort claim based upon defective sled manufactured and sold by predecessor prepetition
barred when asserted against purchaser of assets at 363(0 sale); In re All Am. of Ashburn, Inc., 56 B.R.
186; but see In re Savage Indus., Inc., 43 F.3d 714; Zerand-Bernal Group, Inc. v. Cox, 23 F.3d 159 (7th Cir.
1994); Chicago Truck Drivers Union (Independent) Pension Fund, 59 F.3d 48 (barring successor liability
claims when the injury has not yet occurred and the claimant is not known, and thus has no opportunity
to receive notice and be heard to object, is troubling and problematic). More recent decisions seemingly
foreclose this application of the statute and limit the claims that can be banned on due process grounds.
See, e.g., Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that, as to future tort claims such as
product liability claims, no "claim" arises until the actual harm occurs; rejecting notion that a pedestrian
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even used in the Johns-Manville case to support a mass tort debtor's settlement with its insurer featuring the establishment of a settlement fund by the
insurer and the entry of a channeling injunction, forcing tort plaintiffs to
126
assert their claims, if at all, against that fund.
3. Other Interests that Can Be Stripped Off in a Preplan Sale
In cases examining more esoteric potential "interests," including those of
taxing authorities, co-owners, optionees and the like, § 363(f)(5) is generally
implicated in the process, because the interests are generally protected by
nonbankruptcy law, 127 are not going to be consensually eliminated, 28 are not
subject to satisfaction by the mere payment of money, 129 and are not subject
to a good faith dispute.13 ° As discussed above, § 363(0(5) is the condition
for a free and clear sale that eliminates the need for the other conditions, at
least with regard to interests that can be satisfied through a money judgment
over the objection of the interest-holder in a noneminent domain proceed
ing.131 A state's right to recapture depreciation upon sale or change of use of
has a contingent claim against every automobile that might hit him); In re Piper Aircraft Corp., 162 BR.
619; In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910; Barbara J. Houser et al., Mass Torts and Other Future
Claims, SB37 ALI/ABA 89 (May 1997) (collecting authorities and analyzing different approaches to the
problem).
126MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988)
(§ 363(f) justifies approval of the settlement agreements between asbestos maker and its insurers that
established a settlement fund, transferred or sold the insurance policies and the company's rights to indemnity and defense under those policies, and contained a channeling injunction forcing plaintiffs to assert
their claims only against the settlement fund); Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.),
843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988) (upholding confirmation of plan with similar provisions); In re A.H.Robins
Co., 88 B.R. 742, 743 (E.D. Va. 1988) (confirming plan with channeling injunction), affd sub nom.,
Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959
(1989). These cases and others like them dealing with channeling injunctions and nondebtor releases are
beyond the scope of this Article, except to note their existence and their connection to the power to sell
assets (such as insurance rights and proceeds) free and clear of claims and interests under § 363(f). Fur,
ther, the problem of addressing future claims-claims arising from actions or products already taken or
manufactured but which have not yet caused injury or other actionable damage-is beyond the scope of
this Article, although recent courts considering that issue in reasoned, published decisions conclude that
such claims cannot be addressed in a bankruptcy proceeding either in a preplan sale or one conducted
under a plan of reorganization. See generally In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910.
127Eliminating § 363 (0(1) as a source of sale free and clear power.
2
'Eliminating § 363(f)(2).
29
Eliminating § 363(f)(3).
3
'Eliminating § 363(f)(4).
'See Mattingly, supra note 24 (arguing that exclusion of eminent domain from § 363(0 "legal or
equitable proceedings" is unwarranted). Mattingly states that allowing bankruptcy courts to approve
sales free and clear of any interest whatsoever could foster economic efficiency through the process of
efficient breaches and restructuring of relationships based upon changed circumstances. See id. The wide
ranging, potentially disruptive effects of such a reading that some might imagine could easily be mitigated
by use of the court's § 363(e) power to adequately protect parties in interest and avoid an uncompensated
and unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 363(e) (2000) (court "shall" impose adequate protection conditions on sales free and clear); Ultimate
Sports Bar, Inc. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 540, 549 (Fed. Cl. 2001) (denying tenant Fifth Amendment
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property, 132 a debtor's homestead exemption, 13 3 a wife's tenancy-in-common
interest,13 4 a recorded right of first refusal, 35 and renters' rights to obtain
taking claim based upon debtor/landlord's rejection of lease in Chapter 11 case, stating that the "present
decision is in no way intended to preclude such claims from being cognizable in this tribunal in the future.
This is especially true when the judicial proceedings at issue involve bankruptcy-an area with a longstanding congressional policy to protect private property from uncompensated deprivations."); see generally
In re Valuation Proceedings Under § 303(c) and § 306 of the Regional Rail Reorganization Act of 1973,
445 F. Supp. 994, 1001-03 (Reg'l Rail Reorg. Ct. 1977) (discussing interrelationship of bankruptcy and
eminent domain powers); Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62 (D. Haw. 1979) (government condemnation of
land from owners that previously leased and refused to sell land to tenants upheld as part of governmental
redevelopment and land reform program even though after the taking the land was immediately sold to
former tenants for the condemnation price) (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)) (upholding
comprehensive use of eminent domain power to redevelop slums, even if this included resale of condemned
land to private interests)), rev'd, 702 F. 2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Haw. Housing Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984)). Of course, notice to interested parties would need to be adequate, a real
issue in this context as those benefitted by an in rem interest may not otherwise appear as creditors in the
debtor's schedules or records although they would seem to have sufficient presale relationships with the
debtor to satisfy the Piper test for determining where to cut off the debtor's right to affect future claimants. Cf. In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910 (discussing notice problem in context of unknown
claimants); see generally Reliable Elec. Co. v. Olson Constr. Co., 726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984) (due
process requires adequate notice to those whose rights are to be affected in the bankruptcy proceeding).
Further exacerbating the notice problem is the fast track process often used for § 363(f) sales. They are
merely contested matters and approval of the sale is sought by simple motion, see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4001,
6006, 9014, although in practice a two-step motion process is generally used: the first step is to preliminarily approve the opening bid and procedures, the second to approve the final buyer. In re The Plastic
Surgery Co., No. ND 02-10980,RR through ND 02-10983-RR, Order (1) Establishing Sale Procedures for
Sale of Substantially All of the Debtor's Assets, (2) Approving Termination Fee and Expense Reimburse,
ment, (3) Setting Deadline to Object to Proposed Cure Amounts and (4) Approving Form and Manner of
Notice of Cure Amounts (Bankr. C.D. Cal. May 3, 2002) (unpublished decision). Approval can be obtained in as little as twenty days, and often is granted in no more than sixty or ninety days, although this
will vary with the size and complexity of the case and the degree of exigency of the "articulated business
justification" for the preplan sale under § 363(b). See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4003(d); see also supra note 30
(discussing the articulated business justification standard). If no objections are received, a hearing is not
even necessary. FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003; see also 11 U.S.C. § 102(1) (2000) (defining "notice and a
hearing" as including no hearing at all absent objection or if time does not permit). Unfortunately for
plain-meaning academics that support a broad reading of the Bankruptcy Code and countless potential
debtors yearning to be free of in rem interests, the courts have generally not allowed such interests to be
stripped off under § 363(f). See generally Kuney, supra note 2.
issWBQ P'ship v. Commonwealth of Va. (In re WBQ P'ship), 189 B.R. 97, 99 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995)
(free and clear sale authorized; state's right to recapture prior depreciation was an "interest" that could be
reduced to a money judgement); accord P.K.R. Convalescent Ctrs., Inc. v. Commonwealth of Va. (In re
P.K.R. Convalescent Centers, Inc.), 189 B.R. 90, 95 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995).
i"'In re Crabtree, 112 B.R. 420, 422 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989).
14Gerdes v. Gerdes (In re Gerdes), 33 B.R. 860, 870-71 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983); but cf. Community
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of New York v. Persky (In re Persky), 134 B.R. 81 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1991)
(tenancy by the entireties interests are not amenable to sale under § 363(h) as such tenancy is not an
undivided interest, such disposition would divest the spouse not only of an ownership interest but also a
survivorship interest; and finding that § 363(h) is unconstitutional as it is beyond the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution, stating, at 103-04, "[w]e view section 363(h) as a
mechanism for redistribution of wealth, infringing on the rights of third parties who are neither debtors
nor creditors in favor of only creditors of the bankrupt's estate and feel that, under the Takings Clause,
such an action does not meet the 'public use' requirement.").
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leases under a rent stabilization law 13 6 have all been characterized as a sort of
interest that can be stripped off as part of a sale free and clear under
§ 363(0.137
This is consistent with the overall spirit of § 363, which is one of promoting alienability of property of the estate right up to the constitutional
limit of the Fifth Amendment "takings" clause, regardless of whoever else
may have an interest in that property, 138 except as specifically addressed in
its subsections. 13 9 Courts only seem to cry "foul" when they are faced with
attempts to use § 363 to strip off traditional in rem interests that run with
the land.14 ° When faced with such an attempt, they constrain the definition
"'In re Fleishman, 138 B.R. 641 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1992).
13 6Cheslock-Bakker & Assocs, Inc. v. Kremer (In re Downtown Athletic Club of New York City), No.
M-47 (JSM), 2000 WL 744126 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2000) (recognizing that the asserted right to obtain
leases was not a "claim" under the Code's definition as it was merely a right to seek an equitable remedy,
and as such the debtor's confirmation of a plan could not discharge this right, but finding that it was an
"interest" and thus could be stripped off the property sold by using § 363(0 and citing, among others, In re
Taylor, 198 BR. 142, 162 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1996), for the proposition that "a leasehold interest is a type of
'interest' that fits within the plain text of the § 363(0(4) statute.").
i3 7There is a tension between § 363(0 and § 365(h) as applied to leases. Section 363(0, of course,
provides for a sale free and clear of any interest, including a leasehold interest, if certain conditions are met.
Under § 365(h), however, a tenant has the right to maintain occupancy of premises after a debtor/landlord has rejected a lease. There lies the tension. Can a debtor accomplish complete divestiture of a
tenant's rights by selling free and clear when it could not achieve this same end through rejection of the
lease? Compare Precision Indust., Inc. v. Qualitech Steel SBQ, LLC (In re Qualitech Steel Corp.), 2001
U.S. Dist. Lexis 8328, 2001 WL 699881 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (holding that the specific protection given lessees
under § 365(h) controlled over the more general free and clear provisions of § 363(f)), with In re Down,
town Athletic Club, 2001 WL 744126 (holding that § 365(h) applies only if the debtor retains the prop,
erty and rejects the lease and § 363(0 applies to a sale free and clear). Resolution of this split of authority
is beyond the scope of this Article. See also C.H.E.G., Inc. v. Millenium Bank, No. A094020, 2002 WL
1341140, 2002 Cal. App. Lexis 4307 (Cal. Ct. App. June 20, 2002) (construing sale free and clear of lease
in prior bankruptcy case to have resulted in sale free and clear of broker's right to a commission when the
leased property was later sold to the tenant under the lease, which contained the commission provision).
i"SPlank, supra note 104 at 571-72 (recognizing the expansive spirit of § 363 and concluding that the
statute goes too far and is unconstitutional in that § 363(h) allows sales of nondebtor co-tenant interests
in the absence of the protections of § 363(0's five alternative conditions).
i9,See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 363(g) (2000) (authorizing sale free and clear of "vested right[s] in the nature
of dower or courtesy [sic]"); 11 U.S.C. § 363(h) (2000) (authorizing sale free and clear of an interest as a
.tenant in common, joint tenant, or tenant by the entirety" if certain conditions are met); but see In re
Churchill Properties, III, Ltd. P'ship, 197 B.R. 283 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (where attempted presale rejec,
tion of lease of real property was denied because of improper notice, but sale of real property proceeded,
and lease was subsequently rejected, § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) right of lessee to remain in possession trumped
§ 363(0 free and clear provision under rule of construction that specific and later enacted provisionshere § 365(h)-prevail over general, earlier enacted ones-here § 363(0); accord In re Taylor, 198 B.R.
142, 165 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1996); see also supra note 137 concerning the § 363(0/363(h) debate.
4
'But see Fairchild Aircraft Inc. v. Campbell (In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 920
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) (grounding analysis of what can be sold free and clear of interests in property
under § 363(f) in whether or not the interest is truly an in rem interest; if it is, the interest can be stripped
off), vacated by 220 B.R. 909 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998). This concern is properly addressed through the
Code's "adequate protection" and "indubitable equivalent" requirements rather than by recharacterization
of property rights as falling in or out of the definition of "interest." See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (2000) (adequate
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of "interest" to block the sale free and clear of the in rem interest in contrast
to their broad interpretation of "interests" to include "claims."141
II. THE EFFECTS OF INCLUDING "CLAIMS" WITHIN
"INTERESTS" IN SECTION 363(f)
The courts' inclusion of "claims" within "interests" under § 363(0142 and
43
the erosion of the bias against preplan sales of substantial groups of assets'
has led to the use of Chapter 11 to achieve a prenegotiated sale of a business
or group of assets and to protect the buyer from successor liability. Combined with the lack of any requirement of insolvency on the part of a
debtor,144 vague "you know it when you see it" 14 standards for good faith in
commencing a bankruptcy case, 146 and the ability of the dominant parties to
protection nonexclusively described); 11 U.S.C. § 363(e)(2000) (adequate protection for § 363 sales); 11
U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000) (adequate protection through attachment to proceeds for sales free and
clear under a plan); 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2000) (indubitable equivalent alternative for
cramdown).
141
See Kuney, supra note 2.
4
1 2See supra notes 90,104 and accompanying text.
14
3See supra note 31.
1441nre JohnsManville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 730 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); accord In re Cohoes Indus.
Terminal, Inc., 931 F.2d 222, 228 (2d Cir. 1991); but see Plank, supra note 104, at 545-56 (1996) (explaining that balance sheet or cash flow insolvency of the debtor is an inherent limitation on the Bankruptcy
Clause); see also Thomas E. Plank, Why BankruptcyJudges Need Not and Should Not be Article III Judges,
567, 629-36 (1998) (arguing that bankruptcy judges need not be appointed for life
72 AM. BANKR. L.J.
under Article III of the U.S. Constitution so long as their activities are limited to the permissible scope of
bankruptcy law, the adjustment of the insolvent debtorcreditor relationship). According to Professor
Plank's research, this principle requires that a debtor may not be in bankruptcy unless he, she, or it is
insolvent in either a balance sheet sense or a cash flow sense. He also notes that there was an explicit
insolvency requirement under federal bankruptcy law for liquidations until 1939 and for reorganizations
until 1979. The Manville rule-insolvency is not required-however, remains hornbook black letter law.
In attempting to harmonize these two views it should be noted that in today's highly leveraged world of
business, debtors can easily manipulate their balance sheets, operations and cash flow to produce the
insolvency or looming insolvency that Professor Plank's view requires. See generally KEVIN J. DELANEY,
STRATEGIC BANKRUPTcY 66-71 (Univ. Cal. Press 1988) (reviewing stream of events leading to JohnsManville's recognition, on the eve of its bankruptcy filing, of two billion dollars in contingent asbestos
litigation claims that, without invoking the automatic stay by filing a bankruptcy petition, would have
allowed its lenders to accelerate loans and other debts and render it balance sheet insolvent as well as
unable to meet its debts as they came due).
4
'Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring, discussing difficulty of
concrete definition of obscenity).
14'The test for good faith is "whether a debtor is attempting to unreasonably deter and harass credi,
tors or attempting to effect a speedy, efficient reorganization on a feasible basis." In re Marsch, 36 F.3d
825, 828 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing In re Arnold, 806 F.2d 937, 939 (9th Cir. 1986)). Good faith is lacking
'only where the debtors' actions are a clear abuse of the bankruptcy process." Arnold, 806 F.2d at 939
(existence of good faith depends on amalgam of factors and not upon a specific fact); In re Thirtieth Place
Inc., 30 B.R. 503, 505 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1983) (good faith cannot be denied where it is evident that Debtor
is attempting to effect a speedy efficient reorganization on a feasible basis). The ovular case of In re Little
Creek Dev. Co., 779 F.2d 1068, 1073 (5th Cir. 1986), identified ten common conditions indicating bad
faith, generally aimed at single asset real estate cases, but which are, unfortunately, exhibited by most real
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create a business justification for a quick sale, 147 the bankruptcy courts are
being turned into the auction houses of choice for businesses with either financial trouble or the potential of liabilities that would otherwise follow
their assets. 148 Some counsel already generally advise purchasers' 49 of those
businesses that the preferred method of acquisition is through a quick Chapter 11 case featuring a prenegotiated asset purchase agreement and a preplan
§ 363(0 sale free and clear. Indeed, it may already be malpractice not to at
least advise clients of the potential benefits of this process in many
circumstances.

A.

THE EFFECTS ON PRINCIPAL STAKEHOLDERS

Before embracing or condemning this trend, one must determine whose
ox, if anyone's, is being gored by the practice.' 50 The principle stakeholdproperty owning entities at one time or another, whether financially strapped or not, whether commercial
or not.

14 7

Cf. Wolf v. Weinstein, 372 U.S. 633, 642 (1963) ("one who exercises control over a reorganization
plan holds a post which might tempt him to affect or influence corporate policies-even the shaping of the
very plan of reorganization -for the benefit of his own security holdings but to the detriment of the
Debtor's interests and those of its creditors and other interested groups.").
14SSee John Shinal, Dead Dot-Coms Can Still Cause Havoc, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 12, 2001, at 50 (explaining that dot-corn bankruptcy filings have led to the auctioning of computer equipment at "dirt-cheap
prices"); Luis Salazar, The Difficulties PractitionersCan Face When Dealing with Dot-Corn Bankruptcies,
18 No. 1 BANKR. STRATEGIST 1 (2000) (predicting the deluge of dot'com bankruptcies); Brian L. Davidoff, Reorganizing the Internet Company, 37 BCD NEWS & COMMENT 5 (2001) (discussing different meth,
ods for valuing internet companies in the bankruptcy process); Dot-Corns Filing Bankruptcy
Unconventionally, (Oct. 15, 2001) available at <http://www.usatoday.com/life/cyber/invest/2001/10/
15/dotcom-bankruptcies.htm>.

i49The protections afforded by conducting the transaction within a bankruptcy case are not limited to
purchasers. The officers, directors, and insiders of the debtor/seller can often benefit from having the sale
approved by a bankruptcy court, which can and often does enter findings of fact and conclusions of law
that accompany the sale order to the effect that, among other, things, the sale was for fair value and
reasonably equivalent consideration; the bankruptcy case and the sale were supported by the informed
business judgment of the officers and directors of the debtor, formed after reasonable inquiry under the
circumstances; and that the sale is in the best interests of stockholders, creditors, and all other stakehold
ers. See George W. Kuney, The Hijacking of Chapter 11: Secured Creditors Have Climbed The Learning
Curve (publication pending; copy on file with author) [hereinafter Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11]. Find
ings like this are, of course, drafted by the prevailing parties to serve their own interests in defending

against later claims and lawsuits. They are often justified, if at all, as a condition of closing imposed by the
purchaser, who claims to want insulation from claims that could support fraudulent transfer or similar
claims that could result in recission, avoidance or unwinding of the sale, or litigation that could distract the
insiders of the debtor from their postsale duties to the purchaser which will hire them immediately after
closing. See generally In re Automationsolutions Int'l, LLC, 274 BR. 527 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (discussing and disparaging overbroad comfort order approving sale).
i"'Cf Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (discussing classification of racial
discrimination as "benign" or "malign" and finding the distinction depends on one's perspective: whose ox
is being gored or whose "eye" is that of the "beholder"); see also C.R. Bowles &John Egan, The Sale of the
Century or a Fraud on Creditors?: The Fiduciary Duty of Trustees and Debtors in Possession Relating to
the "Sale" of the Debtors' Assets in Bankruptcy, 28 U. MEM. L. Rev. 781 (1998) (examining impacts of
mechanics of § 363 sales upon debtors' fiduciary duties and urging limits on use of control incentives,
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ers' 5 1 involved are easily categorized. First are those with a legally cognizable direct claim against or interest in the debtor or its assets: secured
creditors,152 administrative priority creditors,'5 3 other priority creditors, 154
general unsecured creditors,'"5 landlord creditors, 156 employees with longterm employment contracts or collective bargaining agreements, 157 and
adoption of a benefit to the estate test for stalking horse protections, and giving bona fide bidders standing
to object to and appeal § 363 motions and orders).
"'See Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of ContractBankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 519
(it is not enough to examine bankruptcy law from a perspective of creditor welfare; all parties affected by
the debtor's financial distress should be considered in the analysis); see generally The CorporateStakeholder
Conference, 43 TORONTo LJ. 297,798 (1993) (series of articles examining various stakeholder constituencies of artificial business entities).
"'52Secured creditors are those that hold a security interest or lien on the debtor's property. 11 U.S.C.
§ 506(a) (2000). They are oversecured if they hold a lien or security interest that, because of its priority
or the value of the collateral, is sufficient to ensure payment through foreclosure of the full balance of their
claim, in which case they may be entitled to postpetition interest, attorneys' fees, and other costs and
charges. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2000); United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (involun,
tary oversecured creditors entitled to interest; voluntary oversecured creditors entitled to interest and
reasonable fees, costs, and expenses provided for in their agreements). Undersecured creditors are those
whose lien or security interest, because of priority or the value of the collateral, is insufficient to ensure
payment of their full claim; they hold two claims, one secured up to the value of their lien and the other an
unsecured deficiency claim that, generally, is classified with those of the general unsecured creditors. 11
U.S.C. § 506(a), (d) (2000).
i"'Administrative priority creditors are those with claims for administrative expenses under § 503(b)
and United States Trustee fees under Chapter 123 of title 28. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1) (2000). Section
503(b) administrative expenses include the postpetition actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving
the estate, including allowed fees of professionals such as attorneys and accountants, certain taxes and
fines, and certain creditor or indenture trustee expenses that result in a benefit to the estate. 11 U.S.C.
§ 503(b) (2000).
iS4 Other priority unsecured creditors include limited claims for employee wages and commissions,
contributions to employee benefit plans, amounts owing to grain producers and fishermen, customer deposits for goods or services, interspousal debts such as alimony and support, additional categories of tax claims,
and FDIC claims. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2)-(9) (2000).
is5General unsecured creditors are a residual class. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(2),(5) (2000). They are not
separately defined by the Code. They include all those that are not secured creditors, priority unsecured
creditors or equity holders. They include landlord creditors and long term employment contract creditors,
to the extent that they are unsecured, although in this discussion those subgroups are broken out sepa,
rately because of statutory maximums imposed upon their claims.
156Landlord creditors are general unsecured creditors to the extent that they are not secured creditors
by reason of a security deposit that they hold. See generally Michael St. James, Landlord Beware: Will a
Security Deposit Survive a Bankruptcy?, 26 CAL. BANKR. J. 44 (2001) (exploring scope of appropriate
application of security deposit and potential for refund of same to the estate under California law). Because landlord claims for breach of a long-term lease of real property may be massive in comparison to the
claims of other unsecured creditors, and because of the potential for mitigation of their future damages
through reletting of the premises involved, the Code imposes a statutory maximum on these claims. 11
U.S.C. § 502(b)(6) (2000) (limiting claims for breach of lease to the greater of the rent for one year or
fifteen percent of the remaining term of the lease, plus unpaid prepetition rent).
is7 Like landlords, employees with long-term employment contracts are subject to a statutory maximum on their claims because of the potential size of the claims, the potential for mitigation of future
damages, and the equity holder-like relationship of those with truly long term employment contracts. 11
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equity stakeholders. 158 Second are those members of society who lack such a
direct legal claim or interest in the debtor or its property, but who are nevertheless also directly affected by the transaction: the debtor's employees, supfiliers, and customers; the surrounding community; and the public at large and
159
its confidence in the judicial system.
1. Secured Creditors
Secured creditors are little harmed by the fast-track sale approach, arguably even benefitting from it.560 Indeed, as a practical matter, large secured
creditors are often instrumental in coordinating the sale, and often consent to
and support it going forward with all possible speed. 161 Even smaller secured
U.S.C. § 502(b)(7) (2000) (limiting such claims to one year's compensation plus unpaid prepetition
compensation).
15
SAlthough the Code treats equity holders as being -interest holders,' see, e.g., § 1129(b)(2)(C) (using
the term for the lowest rung on the priority ladder for absolute priority rule purposes), it nowhere defines
"interest." See also 11 U.S.C. § 101(17) (2000) ("equity security holder" means one holding an "equity
security"); 11 U.S.C. § 101(16) (2000) ("equity security" means corporate shares and similar securities,
limited partnership interests, or warrants or rights to purchase these items). The Code has not quite
caught up to limited liability company (LLC) practice and does not define or take into account LLCs, their
members or membership interests. Yet LLCs are not excluded from being debtors. See 11 U.S.C. § 109
(2000). In all probability, courts faced with the issue will recognize membership interests as equity interests by analogy to the existing classifications of § 101(16).
i"'See William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A STAKEHOLDER THEORY OF THE MODERN CORPORATION: KANTIAN CAPITALISM, ETHICAL THEORY & BusiNESS 97, 101-05 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Nor-

man E. Bowie eds., 3d ed. 1988) (arguing that the typical focus on corporate duties to "shareholders"
should be shared with other "stakeholders" such as employees, suppliers, local communities and perhaps
many others). The shift in the focus from shareholder to stakeholder is demonstrated by passage of statutory "corporate constituency statutes" by over half of the states in the union. Timothy L. Fort, The
Corporationas Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 173, 174 (1997). These statutes generally allow, but do not
require, managers to take into account nonshareholder constituencies in making corporate decisions. Id.
See also Richard M. Cieri et al., Breaking Up Is Hard To Do: Avoiding the Solvency-Related Pitfalls in
Spinoff Transactions, 54 Bus. LAW. 533 n.31 (1999) (discussing constituency statutes and collecting
same).
i6°See Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, supra note 149.
i"'See id. Some would argue that the preplan and plan sale cases of large corporations in Delaware's
accommodating bankruptcy courts is a demonstration of how the Code's sale provisions have allowed
bankruptcy proceedings to be dominated by secured creditors, insiders, and their counsel. It is common in
these cases for the debtor to lack any substantial equity in its assets, and for the case to be commenced or
continued largely to facilitate DIP-lending assisted improvement of secured creditors' position and a sale of
the secured creditors' collateral as a going concern to avoid the need for state law piecemeal foreclosure
proceedings. In exchange for cooperation with this process, the secured lenders allow the corporate insiders to retain their positions and salaries presale, obtain self-serving findings designed to insulate them from
creditor and shareholder liability apart from insurance coverage, receive releases of all liability connected
to the debtor and the case, and the opportunity to seek continued employment with the eventual purchaser. Sometimes unsecured creditors receive a pittance distribution that they would not receive in a
state law foreclosure context, after the creditors' committee and its counsel are paid in full. Despite the
recognition in many districts that it is an unwise use of federal resources to administer a case and conduct
a sales effort solely for the benefit of secured creditors, cf. U.S. Trustee Manual § 3-2.8.3.3 (Feb. 25,
2002), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov.ust/ustp-manal/vol3chO2.htm#3-2.8> (last visited June 4,
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creditors routinely consent to a sale after assuring that the value of their
collateral is reflected in the purchase price and that they will be entitled to
their fair share of the proceeds. Both large and small secured creditors save
costs associated with foreclosing on their collateral by, instead, having it
gathered, managed, and sold by those who are the most familiar with it: the
personnel of the debtor in possession. Further, the going-concern value of the
collateral is likely to be higher than its piecemeal liquidation value, and that
value may be further enhanced by the protection from successor liability to
be enjoyed by the purchaser.162 The bankruptcy sale transaction also benefits secured creditors by reducing collateral and noncollateral to proceeds of
collateral in which a secured party has a direct interest. 163 As a result, in a
§ 363 sale the secured creditor can, in some instances, effectively gain a security interest in noncollateral that is sold, something it could not gain through
state-law foreclosure.164 Finally, because secured creditors maintain their secured status either through possession of the collateral or a filing with the
appropriate state or federal office, their interests are of record and they generally will receive prompt notice of the proposed sale so that they can easily
and effectively appear and protect their interests.
2. Administrative Priority Creditors
Administrative priority creditors are probably also benefitted by the fasttrack process. The dominant players in this category are the United States
trustee and the postpetition professionals, including the debtor's lawyers and
accountants, the unsecured creditors' committee's lawyers and accountants,
2002) (the United States Trustee should be principally concerned with preserving the rights of the unsecured
creditor), the practice is widespread.
62
1 See supra notes 90,119 and accompanying text.
' 63Under the newly revised Article 9 of the U.C.C., a secured party can perfect a security interest on
proceeds of property on which it cannot hold perfected security interest. U.C.C. § 9-408 (1999).
164
An example may make this clear. Assume a television and radio station with an FCC license is
financially troubled. Its assets are all subject to a blanket security interest in favor ofa bank-"all," that is,
but the FCC license, in which the bank cannot take a security interest. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 310(d) (2000)
(license ownership restrictions); In re Merkley, 94 F.C.C.2d 829, 830 (1983) ("The Commission has consistently held that a broadcast license, as distinguished from the station's plant or physical assets, is not an
owned asset or vested property interest so as to be subject to mortgage, lien, pledge, attachment, seizure,
or similar property right."); In re D.H. Overmyer Telecasting Co. Inc., 35 BR. 400, 401 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio
1983) ("The FCC retains continuing jurisdiction over Telecasting's license, despite the Chapter 11 proceeding"). When the station defaults, the bank cannot foreclose on the license, arguably the station's most
valuable asset, as it is not its collateral. Outside of bankruptcy, the bank forecloses on all other property,
the license is unused for the prescribed time and it is canceled by the FCC, resulting in no value for the
secured creditor. In bankruptcy, in contrast, the bank helps the trustee sell the license (with appropriate
FCC consents) and obtains a security interest in the proceeds, essentially reaping a windfall diminished
only by the need to provide the trustee and counsel with a carve-out to cover their fees to induce cooperation. See QUEENAN § 20.19 CHAPTER 11 THEORY AND PRACTICE, SALES OF REGULATED PROPERTY,
LICENSES & PERMITS ("the debtor in possession [of FCC licenses] must receive FCC approval of a proposed assignee of a broadcast license").
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165
and the investment bankers and other brokers engaged as part of the case.
First, all these groups are intimately involved in the case and can be sure to
receive both formal and informal notice of any potential sale. That allows
them to seek full disclosure of all aspects of the transaction, negotiate carveouts or other provisions that will designate some of the proceeds to be applied to their allowed claims for fees and costs, and enjoy inexpensive access
to knowledge about the inside details and dynamics of the proposed
transaction.
Second, and quite important, serving as a professional in a preplan sale
case limits exposure to loss over that which can be sustained in a Chapter 11
case in which the debtor is struggling to emerge from Chapter 11 under a
confirmed plan of reorganization. Especially if the sale is negotiated and documented prepetition, the professionals should know within thirty to ninety
days of the petition date whether or not the sale is likely to gain court approval and be consummated. This stands in marked contrast to the plan confirmation strategy where plan confirmation can take years to achieve. Both
through securing a prepetition retainer large enough to cover fees for one
calendar quarter, and by monitoring and assessing how likely consummation
of the sale is progressing, the professionals can protect their interests. The
one negative effect for administrative priority claimants is that they lose the
right to veto a transaction unless it provides for payment in full of their
allowed administrative claims, which they enjoy in the plan confirmation process. 166 On balance, though, the preplan sale process appears to benefit administrative claimants.

3. Other Priority Creditors
To the extent that other priority creditors are affected by the increase in
preplan sales, it is hard to say whether that effect is positive or negative. On
the positive side, they benefit from the speed of the case, which minimizes
1611 U.S.C. §§ 327-331 (2000) (employment and compensation of professionals and officers).
16611

U.S.C.

§

1129(a)(9) (2000). This is a powerful protection and source of leverage for administra-

tive priority creditors that is only available in the confirmation process. See QUEENAN § 22.01 CHAPTER
11 THEORY AND PRACTICE 22:3 ("In Chapter 11 cases, the very success of the reorganization may depend
on the nature and amount of priority claims. This is especially true with respect to administrative expense
claims (§ 507(a)(1)) and the claims of socalled gap creditors in an involuntary bankruptcy case
(§ 507(a)(2)). 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2000). These claims must be paid in full as a condition of confirmation
of a plan of reorganization. If administrative expense claims are too great, confirmation (and therefore
reorganization) may not be possible."). For the debtors' and committees' attorneys, it may present an
ethical dilemma: insisting upon full payment on the effective date of the plan may undermine or make
impossible one's clients' reorganization or recovery. See MODEL RULES oF PROP'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 ("A
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client."); see also MODEL CODE
OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7,101(A)(1) ("A lawyer shall not intentionally fail to seek the lawful
objectives of his client."); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7,101(A)(3) ("A lawyer shall not
intentionally ... [p]rejudice or damage his client during the course of the relationship"). In practice the
issue is most often resolved by negotiation.
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administrative priority claims that are senior to them, and they benefit from
whatever price enhancement is generated from the free and clear nature of
the sale. 167 On the negative side, like administrative claimants, priority creditors lose the veto power that they enjoy over a plan of reorganization if their
claims are not provided for as specified in § 1129(a)(9).168 Because these
creditors are lower in priority than administrative priority creditors, the impact of this lost veto is greater because it further decreases their already
meager negotiating power. In the end and on balance, due to low payouts on
account of unsecured claims,169 the increased use of preplan sales transactions
is mostly neutral in the case of the less-than-administrative priority creditors.
4. General Unsecured Creditors,Landlord Creditors, and Employees
with LongTerm Employment Contracts or Collective
BargainingAgreements
Below the level of priority creditors, it is harder to assess with any degree
of accuracy the impact of preplan sale procedures on distributions. On balance, however, it is probably negative, although, as with priority creditors,
the speed of the case should help control administrative claims, thus benefitting unsecured creditors. First, distributions to these lower priority creditors
are often extremely low in Chapter 11 cases.' 70 This is so because secured
creditors often use blanket liens to capture the value of all assets at the incep167Mattingly, supra note 24 (asserting that stripping property free and clear of interests increases
value).
161Section I 129(a)(9) provides in pertinent part that, as a requirement for confirmation:
Except to the extent that the holder of a particular claim has agreed to a different
treatment of such claim, the plan provides that(A) with respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(1) or 507(a)(2) of
this title, on the effective date of the plan, the holder of such claim will receive
on account of such claim cash equal to the allowed amount of such claim;
(B) with respect to a class of claims of a kind specified in section 507(a)(3),
507(a)(4), 507(a)(5), 507(a)6), or 507(a)(7) of this title, each holder of a claim of
such class will receive(i) if such class has accepted the plan, deferred cash payments of a value, as
of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim;
or
(ii) if such class has not accepted the plan, cash on the effective date of the
plan equal to the allowed amount of such claim; and
(C) with respect to a claim of a kind specified in section 507(a)(8) of this title,
the holder of such claim will receive on account of such claim deferred cash pay,
ments, over a period not exceeding six years after the date of assessment of such
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, equal to the allowed amount
of such claim.
11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (2000).
"6 9Cf. Tiffany, supra note 102 (statistical analysis of distributions to unsecured creditors in Chapter 7
cases).
70

1 Cf. id.
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tion of prepetition financing or the extension of debtor in possession financing, and business entities have many different judgment-proofing strategies to
employ to channel profits and value to the equity holders and insiders.1 71
Theoretically, any process that decreases higher priority claims and expenses
would benefit these classes, but empirical evidence has yet to be gathered
showing any significant benefit.
The increase in preplan sales would appear to negatively impact the ability of these low priority creditors to meaningfully participate in the proceedings and look after their interests, to the extent they are so inclined172
When a debtor's business is sold preplan, these creditors lose the specific
protections of § 1129, including the best-interests-of-creditors test, 173 the requirement that there be at least one consenting impaired class, 1 74 and the
absolute priority rule. 175 Employees with collective bargaining agreements
lose the protections specifically enacted for them in general, and retirees lose
the protections enacted for their benefit and specifically included in the plan
confirmation process.1 76 Although creditors' committees and their counsel
17 'Lynn M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment Proofing, 51 STAN. L. REV. 147 (1998)
(describing judgment proofing techniques including leases, secured lending instruments, sale agreements,
franchise agreements, licenses, and the formation of operating subsidiaries).
"'72Lynn M. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code?, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 247 (1983) (creditors take little interest in bankruptcy proceedings only because bankruptcy legislation has failed to provide the means for them to exercise meaningful control or to
make their participation profitable).
17111 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (2000) (a confirmable plan must provide that every creditor either accepts
the plan or will receive at least as much as he would in a hypothetical liquidation).
17411 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2000). Because this element is not present in the preplan sale process,
theoretically the debtor could proceed to sale with no support from any class of creditors. Although
unlikely in practice, this is a dramatic difference from the plan process.
1751 1 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2) (2000).
17611 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(13) (2000) (confirmation requirement that retiree benefits be maintained at
levels prescribed by § 1114). It is interesting that Congress has not chosen to specifically include compliance with § 1113, pertaining to the process for rejecting collective bargaining agreements, in § 1129(a)'s
list of conditions to confirmation. The section may be incorporated by indirect reference through
§ 1129(a)(1)'s requirement that the plan comply with 'applicable provisions of [title 11])-although the
existence of § 1129(a)(13) incorporating § 1114 into the confirmation process argues against that result.
In a recent case involving construction of an already approved asset sale, the court determined that the
purchaser was bound by the terms of certain collective bargaining agreements-but only because they
were part of the group of contracts assumed by the purchaser under the terms of its own purchase agreement. Tenet HealthSystem Philadelphia, Inc. v. Nat'l Union of Hosp. & Health Care Employees (In re
Allegheny Health Educ. & Research Found.), 265 B.R. 88 (Bankr. W.D. Penn. 2001). In the face of the
plain assumption language, the court refused to allow a general reference in its order and in the purchase
agreement to the effect that the assets were acquired free and clear of all encumbrances to defeat the
principle that contracts are assumed in toto or not at all. Id. at 101,05; 11 U.S.C. § 1114 (2000) (payment
of insurance benefits to retired employees). But this does not mean that sales of substantially all assets are,
per se, subject to collective bargaining agreements; just the opposite is true. United Food & Comm.
Workers Union v. Family Snacks, Inc. (In re Family Snacks, Inc.), 257 B.R. 884 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2001)
(court upholds rejection of collective bargaining agreement on theory that it was no longer needed for an
effective reorganization after sale of substantially all of the debtor's assets and when the debtor was no
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ensure some protections, the speed at which preplan sales proceed certainly
makes it less likely that individual creditors will be able to meaningfully participate. Further, special interest groups, such as landlords and employees
with long-term employment contracts generally have no committee to address their special needs and interests.' 7 7 On balance, it is hard to see how
speeding up the reorganization case increases the negotiating leverage of these
creditors or provides anything but a decrease in the flow and quality of information they receive and the ability to protect their particular interests. Absent a strong showing that the values received by the estate will be enhanced
sufficiently to meaningfully increase dividends to general unsecured creditors,
there is nothing to outweigh those negatives.

5. Equity Stakeholders
78
Equity holders can generally be divided into three categories: insiders,
majority interest-holders, and minority interestholders. There may be overlaps between these categories. Preplan sales favor these groups in the order
listed when compared to the full process for proposal, solicitation, and confirmation of a reorganization plan. Again, speeding up the case and minimizing
the formal disclosure that must take place, the opportunities to challenge or
test the information disclosed, and the time to negotiate the terms of the deal
benefits those who are on the inside of the deal and those with large stakes
and correspondingly large leverage at the expense of less knowledgeable,
1
smaller interests. 79

6. Employees
To the extent that they are not priority or general unsecured creditors or
equity security holders, employee self-interest lies in the promise of future
employment on similar or better terms. The sale free and clear does nothing
longer a going concern). Debtors and purchasers will run afoul of §§ 1113 and 1114, if at all, only when
they include conditions for modifications and waivers of those obligations in an asset purchase agreement
that provides for their assumption. See, e.g., Am. Flint Glass Workers Union v. Anchor Resolution Corp.,
197 F.3d 76 (3d Cir. 1999). In any event, notwithstanding §§ 1113 and 1114, it would appear that
employees and retirees may be stripped of their benefits under their collective bargaining agreements and
retirement plans if the business is sold as a collection of assets under § 363(b) and (0),unless the affected
parties and the court are vigilant. See, e.g., In re Condere Corp., 228 B.R. 615 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1998)
(court states that any objections by a union to an asset sale can be satisfied by conditioning the sale on the
assumption by the debtor of the collective bargaining agreement and assignment of that agreement to the
purchaser).
'7VBut see 11 U.S.C. § 1114(d) (2000) (upon motion bankruptcy court shall appoint a committee of
retired employees if the debtor seeks to modify or cancel retiree benefits).
17811 U.S.C § 101(31) (2000) (definition of insider).
i79This is not a new phenomenon. In 1940 the Securities and Exchange Commission, under the leader,
ship of Justiceto-be William 0. Douglas, finished three years of study and concluded that public investors
need protection from insiders in reorganization cases. Tabb, supra note 81, at 30 n.216 (citing S.E.C.,
Report on the Study and Investigation of the Work, Activities, Personal Function of Protective and
Reorganization Committees, pts. 1-8 (1937-1940)).
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to advance these interests. Just the opposite, by allowing sales free and clear
of employee successor-liability claims that would lie under applicable nonbankruptcy law as well as free and clear of collective bargaining agreements,
the sale free and clear decreases the leverage that employees would otherwise
enjoy by using successor-liability claims as a point of leverage.1so
Although many Chapter 11 reorganization cases are heralded into court
at their inception with carefully-worded professions of business revitalization
and job preservation after working through whatever event precipitated the
bankruptcy filing, in many sale cases these announcements are made to keep
the employees at their jobs, thereby preserving the going-concern value pending approval of the sale. Many purchasers also desire that the employees stay
on immediately after the closing to manage the transition to new ownership.
Once new management is in place, especially when the purchaser is in the
same business as the debtor/seller, the workforce is often "downsized" to
eliminate duplicate positions.
7. Suppliers and Customers
Similarly, suppliers' and customers' interests are, at best, not advanced
significantly by the preplan sale procedure. As with employees, after the case
is commenced, suppliers and customers are to be mollified and kept satisfied
so that the going-concern value of the business can be preserved. In the case
of purchase by one of the debtor's prepetition competitors, postclosing, suppliers can expect to face increased competition and customers can expect to
face decreased competition, neither of which is to their benefit. Further, to
the extent that suppliers enjoy favorable contracts with the debtor/seller, the
buyer will not be motivated to purchase or to take these contracts by assumption and assignment. The truncated preplan sale procedure minimizes
the time in which the suppliers can enjoy the benefits of their preexisting
contracts.
8. The Surrounding Community and the Public
Any process that increases the speed of change in the rights and duties of
"sSee supra note 124 and accompanying text (citing cases regarding bar of employee successor liability

claims); see also In re Lady H Coal Co., Inc., 193 B.R. 233 (Bankr. S.D. W.Va. 1996) (court does not
approve rejection of collective bargaining agreement, but does approve sale of substantially all the debtor's
assets free and clear of any interest imposed by that agreement); accord After Six, Inc. v. Philadelphia Joint
Bd. (In re After Six, Inc.), 1993 WL 160385 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993); accord New York Typographical
Union No. 6 v. Maxwell Newspapers, Inc. (InreMaxwell Newspapers, Inc.), 981 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
The preplan sale free and clear process effectively guts whatever protection would otherwise be afforded
by § 1114 and § 1129(a)(13). The only argument that can be made in support of this result is that it is
the same result that would follow if the liquidation of the debtor's assets were to take place in a Chapter 7
case. See In reIonosphere Clubs, Inc., 134 B.R. 515 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (recognizing that § 1114 does
not apply to Chapter 7 cases and examining whether it should apply to liquidating Chapter 11 cases and
concluding that, based on its plain language, it must, even though the legislative history suggests that
Congress was not thinking that Chapter 11 included liquidating cases when it enacted the statute).
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various parties has the potential to decrease the meaningful participation of
slow-moving bureaucracies and smaller, unrepresented portions of the community. This being the case, the preplan sale procedure holds the potential
for decreased input from these groups as compared to the plan confirmation
process. With the exception of governmental actors, this difference is probably minimal, since members of the public usually do not have standing to
appear and be heard in the bankruptcy case unless they are creditors or interest holders.,' There is, however, a very real danger that slow-moving government agencies that might otherwise object to or weigh in on a transaction
may be unable to meaningfully participate in the process.18 2 Because the sale
free and clear of claims and interests will bar whatever successor-liability
claims would otherwise exist in favor of the agency,' 8 3 the preplan sale procedure speeds the elimination of recourse to the assets involved unless it arises
from a presale traditional in rem interest that the court will not strip off.
B.

SETTING THE STAGE FOR BACKLASH

All interest groups are affected differently by the choice of a § 363(0
preplan sale free and clear of claims and most interests rather than the plan
confirmation process. Further, no two cases will present the same facts or
the same effects. But the general pattern emerges: The rise of the preplan
sale free and clear in place of the plan confirmation process magnifies the
tendency for larger creditors and those with independent inside knowledge to
benefit at the expense of smaller creditors and those lacking an independent
source of information about the debtor and the transaction.18 4 Any increased
reliance upon an expedited preplan sale procedure enhances the interests of
'S'lN re O'Brien Envtl. Energy, Inc., 181 F.3d 527, 531 (3d Cir. 1999); G-K Dev. Co. v. Broadmoor
Place Invs., L.P. (In re Broadmoor Place Invs., L.P.), 994 F.2d 744, 746 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 1071 (1994); but see In re Colony Hill Assocs., 111 F.3d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that an
exception (and standing for an otherwise non-partyin-interest bidder) exists where the unsuccessful bidder alleges that the purchaser's actions destroyed the intrinsic fairness of the sale).
's2of course, the United States Trustee's Office monitors the case and, if appropriate, may alert or
invite participation by other governmental agencies. See U.S. Trustee Manual §3-1.1 (U.S. Trustee's
general case monitoring duties) (Feb. 25, 2002), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov> (last visited June 4,
2002); id. at §3,4.2.4.2 (discussing overlapping roles of U.S. Trustees and Creditors' Committees); id. at
§3-4.4.1.6 (discussing whether governmental units like the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation are
eligible and should be invited to serve on a creditors committee).
"s3See supra notes 90-98.
'Although courts make bold pronouncements about maintaining protections for all partiesi[u]ndertaking reorganization piecemeal pursuant to § 363(b) should not deny creditors the protection
they would receive if the proposals were first raised in the reorganization plan," Institutional Creditors of
Cont'l Air Lines v. Cont'l Air Lines, Inc. (In re Cont'l Air Lines), 780 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir. 1986)-the
above analysis demonstrates that this is not the case. Realistically, there is no substitute for the plan
confirmation procedure that Congress initially established. Allowing short-circuits of that procedure
through § 363(b) and (f) sales of substantially all the assets of a business unavoidably alters the balance of
power between constituencies in Chapter 11.
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insiders, their professionals, secured creditors, and those who are intimately
involved with the debtor. A relatively quick preplan sale instead of the plan
process makes it more likely that smaller creditors and interest holders, as
well as slower moving government agencies and the public at large, will be
185
caught unaware and unrepresented.
This development is contrary to many of the fundamental policies that
underlie the bankruptcy process. Bankruptcy, under any chapter of the Code,
is designed to be a collective proceeding in which the interests of the stakeholders in the debtor are weighed and balanced.' 8 6 Debtors and their insiders
face extensive disclosure requirements and are subject to special scrutiny regarding prepetition transfers and dealings with the debtor as well as postpetition compensation and other transfers.' 8 7 In Chapter 11, through the
confirmation process, extensive disclosure is required prior to voting on the
merits of a plan.L8s Even after this disclosure, there are a set of confirmation
standards, some absolute and some flexible, that constrain the plan's terms so
'85 Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a) (providing nongovernmental parties with twenty days to file answer to
complaint and sixty days for government parties).
6
"S See S. REP. No. 95-989 (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5800 (providing that the Code
recognizes the "three-way tension" between the general creditor's interest in recouping their investment,
the debtor's interest in a fresh start, and the tax collector's interest in raising revenue); H.R. REP. No. 95595 (1977), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. (recognizing that one of the myriad policies in bankruptcy is the
equality of treatment of all creditors); see also Rosemary Williams, Annotation, Time and Method of
Valuation under 11 U.S.C. § 506, of Security Held by Creditor of Bankruptcy, 134 A.L.R. FED. 439 (1996)
("When the Bankruptcy Code was enacted in 1978, the drafters labored long to ensure that rights and
remedies provided to creditors and debtors by the statute were balanced."); Thomas H. Jackson, The
Fresh-StartPolicy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (1985) ("most of bankruptcy law is
concerned not with defining a debtor's right of discharge, but with providing a compulsory and collective
system for satisfying the claims of creditors"); In re Chavarria, 117 BR. 582, 584 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990)
("The Bankruptcy Code, by its very nature, is an attempt to balance the interests of debtors and their
creditors.").
'SWSee 11 U.S.C. § 343 (2000) (the debtor shall appear and submit to examination under oath at § 341
meeting of creditors and equity holders); 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2000) (the debtor must file a schedule of
financial data and if a trustee is serving in the case, surrender to the trustee all the property of the estate
and any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers relating to property of the
estate regardless of whether immunity is granted under § 344); 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b)(4)(B) (2000) (providing that a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property made to an insider is a voidable preference if the
transfer is made within one year of the petition date); 11 U.S.C. § 101 (13) (2000) (defining an "insider");
11 U.S.C. § 1106 (2000) (a)(2),(4) (where a trustee has been appointed, the trustee shall file the § 521
disclosures, investigate relevant data about the debtor, file a statement of investigation including any
irregularity in the management of the affairs of the debtor); 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2000) (saddling debtor in
possession with § 1106 duties); 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000) (a disclosure statement containing adequate
information enabling a hypothetical reasonable investor to make an informed judgement about the plan); 11
U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(4) and (5) (2000) (requiring disclosure and court approval of certain payments made or
to be made in connection with the plan or the case along with the disclosure of the identity of any
director, officer, voting trustee, or insider that will be employed or retained by the reorganized debtor and
the nature of any compensation for such insider).
'SSSee 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000) (court finding that disclosure statement provides "adequate information" is prerequisite to soliciting acceptances and rejections of plan).
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that minimum standards of treatment for all creditors and interest holders are
met, no matter how small or unrepresented they are.' 8 9 The use of § 363(0
sales free and clear to avoid these requirements and standards undermines the
original balance of the Bankruptcy Code system, tilting the bankruptcy system toward debtors, insiders, and large secured creditors.
Overuse of preplan sales free and clear to aggressively strip claims and
interests from assets sold may result in a backlash against the process and,
perhaps, a resurgence of hostility to preplan, reorganization-dispositive transactions in Chapter 11 cases. 190 That result would be consistent with the
history of United States bankruptcy laws, which is one of a cycle of expansion of debtor relief,'9 1 followed by perceptions of debtors abusing the system, followed by a contraction of debtor rights and an increase in creditors'
rights or even abolishment of bankruptcy, followed in turn by perceptions of
creditor abuse, a need for debtor relief, and a repetition of the cycle.192
" 9 See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (2000) (what must and may be included in a plan); 11 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000)
(prohibition on solicitation of acceptances and rejections of plan until court has approved disclosure statement as containing "adequate information"); 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2000) (confirmation standards).
i9sThe shift in treatment of future claimants from Manville and Robbins to Piper and FairchildAircraft may presage this backlash. In Manville and Robbins the courts embraced bars to successor liability
based on § 363 and § 105. MacArthur Co. v. Johns,Manville Corp. (In re Johns,Manville Corp.), 837
F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1988). Piper and FairchildAircraft, are not so gung-ho about this proposition. See In re
Piper Aircraft Corp. 162 B.R. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.1994); In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995). Cf.Pub. L. No. 98-353 (1984) (postContinental Airlines amendments to
Bankruptcy Code included addition of § 1114 to legislatively overrule Bildisco case after outrage and
lobbying following Continental's rejection of its collective bargaining agreement in Chapter 11).
i9iFor example, from the early 1980s to the mid-1990s the doctrine of bankruptcy uber alis seemed to
prevail. This was the era of Manville involving the use of a channeling injunction and the "sale" of rights
under insurance policies to a trust to limit the rights of present, known creditors and future, unknown, and
unrepresented creditors alike to allow the debtor to shed these liabilities and continue in business, and
Continental Airlines, in which the case was commenced specifically to break a union's collective bargain
agreement. Essentially, during this period the Bankruptcy Code apparently preempted all other law if a
"valid reorganization purpose" existed. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 526 (1984) (conflict between federal labor and bankruptcy law resolved in favor of bankruptcy law); see generally KEVIN J.
DELANEY, STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY (Univ. Cal. Press 1988) (detailing strategies and outcome of
Manville and Continental bankruptcy cases). More recent years have seen a contraction of this trend,
although some would argue that overall the Bankruptcy Code is flexibly interpreted to solve problems that
society's normal economic and political institutions and marketplaces are unable to process adequately. See
DELANEY, supra. The Enron debacle appears to fit this mold, and the debtor in that case is also seeking to
use § 363 as a way to solve its problems, or at least reduce the issues in its reorganization and speed up its
bankruptcy case. See Enron Presents Process to Creditors' Committee for Separating Power, Pipeline Company from Bankruptcy, available at <http://www.enron.com/corp/pressroom/releases/2002/ene/23O050302ReleaseLtr.html> (press release of May 3, 2002).
192Tabb, supra note 81, at 16.20 (1995) (tracing ebb and flow of bankruptcy law from prerevolution'
ary times to 1995, noting that various pro-debtor and pro'creditor changes are historically triggered by the
then-recent state of the economy and shifting perceptions of debtor or creditor abuse). A similar cycle has
occurred regarding extending the automatic stay to prevent suits against codebtors such as guarantors,
partners, officers, and directors. Earlier requests for codebtor stays were almost routinely granted based
upon vague assertions of how the distraction caused by such suits would threaten the debtors' prospects
for reorganization. See, e.g., In re Old Orchard Inv. Co., 31 B.R. 599, 601 (D.C. Mich. 1983) (extending
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The expansive construction given to § 363(f), that assets can be sold "free
and clear" of "claims," appears unlikely to change. 19 3 More likely, the increase
in the use of Chapter 7 and 11 proceedings to effect the sale and purchase of
a business or its assets will continue, with counsel and business clients increasingly using the bankruptcy process to limit exposure to unknown liabilities, and with bankruptcy courts increasingly asked to provide a shield for
purchasers from the claims of the debtor's creditors. 194 In some senses, the
bankruptcy system is being used to solve the problem caused by purchasers'
inability to take much comfort in the representations, warranties, and indemnities of the seller of a business, whether failing or not, or of its principals. A
free-and-clear order that is final and nonappealable, backed up by the Bankruptcy and Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution, and entitled to full faith and credit in federal and state courts across the country is an
effective tool indeed. By foreclosing the claims as a matter of law, there is no
need for the parties to design an effective transactional mechanism to allocate
stay to shield partner of debtor partnership); accord In reOtero Mills, Inc., 25 BR. 1018 (D.N.M. 1982);
but see, e.g., In re Aboussie Bros. Const. Co., 8 B.R. 302, 303 (D.C. Mo. 1981) (refusing to extend stay to
partners in the debtor). As a result, more routine and aggressive use of the technique spawned calls for
restraint or abolishment of the practice and adoption of the traditional four-part test for a preliminary
injunction for the extension of the stay to nondebtor parties. See In re Kalispell Feed & Grain Supply, Inc.,
55 B.R. 627, 629 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1985). The result is that today such requests, when granted, are often
conditioned on specific progress in the Chapter 11 case or limited in scope and duration. The National
Bankruptcy Review Commission's recommendations that Congress address whether § 363 allows sales
free and clear of claims and how to deal with the problem of future claims indicates that at least the most
knowledgeable circles of the insolvency community recognize the lack of uniformity and potential for abuse
and waste inherent in the current state of the law. See, NAT'L BANKR REVIEW COMM'N REP., supra note
9; see also Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical Reappraisal of Non'
Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 959 (1997) (reviewing history of
codebtor stays and nondebtor releases under current and prior law and finding nondebtor releases to be
without jurisdictional, theoretical, or congressional justification). Things are not that different now than
inJustice Douglas' days at the SEC, see supra note 179. Investors and the other disadvantaged constituencies discussed in this Article need protection from insiders, including large secured creditors. See 11
U.S.C. §§ 101(31)(B)(iii), 101(31)(C)(v) (2000) ("insiders" of corporations and partnerships to include
those in control of those entities, in the reorganization process); see Kuney, Hijacking Chapter 11, supra
note 149. The trend toward use of preplan sales free and clear does nothing to provide this needed
protection. Reversing it would.
93
1 Of course, the circuit courts of appeals and the United States Supreme Court could work a sea of
change of this magnitude. However, the effectiveness of § 363(m) and current "speedy close" practice in
mooting appeals makes it seldom that appeals get that far. See supra note 32. Declaratory relief actions
brought by a debtor as a precondition to a sale might present the opportunity for meaningful judicial
review. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mercier, 913 F.2d 273, 277 (6th Cir. 1990) (a declaratory judgment
may be appropriate under the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000), where it will
serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations in dispute and it will afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity, and controversy giving rise to the proceedings). But this is exactly why they are not and
will not be brought.
4
19 But see Paul Traub, Value and Cents: Strategic Disposition of Assets - Sometimes the Best Deal
Isn't on the Courthouse Steps, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 26 (Nov. 1998) (detailing benefits of nonbankruptcy strategic asset dispositions).
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risk between them-§ 363(f) as interpreted eliminates the risk. The losers
under this scheme are successor-liability claimants, smaller, low priority creditors, and slow-moving entities and agencies. 195 To correct this trend under
the existing statute, courts should hew to the plain meaning of the statute,
recognize that when Congress wanted to speak of claims and interests it did
so, and that postconfirmation vesting of property free and clear of claims and
interests under a confirmed and consummated plan is the proper route to
achieve this end.
CONCLUSION
Reverting to the plain meaning of the statute provides a principled way
to avoid a-further slide away from Chapter 1 l's plan-confirmation focus. 196

Courts should recognize the difference between the language of § 363 and
§ 1141(c). The inclusion of the word "claims" in the latter section demonstrates that the Code's use of the term "interest" in the first section does not
include "claims." 197 The thorny and wide-ranging issues involved in sales free
and clear of claims, including those future claims that may be contingent,
unrealized or unknown at the time of sale, can best be addressed, if at all,
through the plan proposal and confirmation process. That process provides
the opportunity to carefully examine the circumstances, identify potential
claimants, and allow a deliberate determination of what form of notice and
opportunity to be heard is required to address due process concerns.
Adopting this plain meaning interpretation gives effect to the intent behind §§ 363 and 1141 as enacted, as well as the plan-focused scheme of
Chapter 11. It also helps to ensure that the bankruptcy process does not run
roughshod over the due process rights of potential successor-liability claim
holders.198 Although it may slow some sales of legitimately distressed businesses, and may even reduce the consideration received, 99 a shift to plain
meaning will provide for proper consideration of competing claims and inter95

This may be yet another example of the trend towards the elimination of any real liability of

incorporeal entities beyond their insurance policies. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106
YALE LJ. 1 (1996) (arguing that American businesses are rendering themselves judgment proof because of
the ease with which a modern debtor can grant secured credit, the growth of asset securitization, the
availability of foreign havens for hiding assets, and the traditional ways of avoiding legal liability, such as

scattering assets among subsidiaries); but see James J. White, Corporate Judgment Proofing: A Response to
Lynn LoPucki's The Death of Liability, 107 YALE LJ. 1363 (1998) (arguing that American businesses are
not judgment proof and pointing to data showing that public companies grant much more modest levels of
security than would be necessary to become judgment proof, that most companies have lien-free assets that
greatly exceed their liabilities, and that most companies carry substantial amounts of liability insurance).
196Alternatively, Congress could amend § 363 to incorporate the dominant (mis)interpretations discussed in this Article. See Kuney, supra note 3.
197
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
issee supra notes 91-120 and accompanying text.
199
The largest area of impact would be on Chapter 7 sales, in which sales free and clear of claims
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ests, and allow a sale free and clear of claims under plans of reorganization
only when the debtor meets the Code's disclosure and confirmation requirements and when such a transaction is in the best interests of creditors as well
20 0
as fair and equitable to those who do not accept the plan.
Although this proposed reversion to a plain language construction of the
statute would reverse the effects of the prevalent misinterpretation, the
weight of authority and the roadblocks to effective appellate review of
preplan sale orders make a change unlikely. The result will be the continued
and increased use of the bankruptcy courts for asset dispositions and acquisitions. That is, unless Congress or the courts act to either enforce the plain
language of the statute or modify the statute to provide for preplan sales that
close due process gaps and successor liability loopholes that Congress did not
intend.

would be impossible, See supra note 102. This effect, however, is likely to be negligible in terms of
economic impact. See supra note 103.
2
°For a proposal incorporating preplan sales as an explicit alternative exit from Chapter 11, see Kuney,
supra note 3.
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